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S U M M A R Y
The problems faced by a company in determining its bids on a sequence o f contracts put 
out to  tender has been studied extensively in past literature. This thesis concentrates on 
formalising and developing these existing models as well as presenting new m odels for both 
the competing bidders and the tendering organisation.
Development o f these models involves reviewing and extending theoretical results in the areas 
o f time series analysis, m ulti-arm ed bandits, and finitely additive probability distributions.
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 T h e  S equ en tia l B id d in g  P ro b le m .
Organisations such as public authorities and large companies are often required to employ 
outside contractors to carry out work for them. The usual method o f  awarding such a contract 
is to put it out to tender, as follows. The organisation will invite a sm all number o f companies, 
from a larger pool o f companies, to submit a bid, or  estimate, o f their charge for the work. 
It is common for the company submitting the lowest bid to be automatically awarded the 
contract, especially when the work is o f  a moderate cost. If the same organisation is sequentially 
tendering similar contracts to  the same pool o f  companies we shall refer to the problems faced 
by the tendering organisation (tenderer) and bidding companies (bidders) as The Sequential 
Bidding Problem. The aim o f this thesis is to  present mathematical models for both the 
tenderer and the bidders to assist in their decision making process in a sequential bidding 
environment.
The tenderer’s problem is, for each contract, to select a subset o f  the pool o f companies who, 
on the one hand, he believes will between them quote a low bid, and on the other hand will 
provide him with useful information as to which companies to invite to  bid  in the future. When 
formulated mathematically this leads to a stochastic control problem which is a generalisation 
o f the well known multi-armed bandit problem.
The bidder’s problem is to  select a bid that is large enough to ensure a reasonable profit, 
but small enough to have a significant chance o f  winning. He might also take into account 
the fact that consistently high bidding may alienate the tenderer and result in him not being 
invited to bid on future contracts.
Before discussing the problem further, and outlining the aims o f  this thesis, it is worth 
emphasising the appropriateness o f the Bayesian approach for modelling this problem. Most 
practitioners would accept that the role o f a mathematical sequential decision model is to pro­
vide and update basic parameters that the models operator should then use, in conjunction 
with any subjective information he may have, to  formulate a decison at each time period. A  
Bayesian model has the attractive feature that it permits, and indeed encourages, the incorpo­
ration o f subjective information at all time periods. This is particularly useful in a sequential
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bidding environment where subjective information is likely to be readily available. For example 
one may learn that a particular bidder is likely to be behaving differently for the next contract 
or tw o, for, say, financial reasons.
We now consider the possible approaches to modelling the problem.
A n ambitious way to model the whole problem is to use a game theoretic model with the 
tenderer and the individual bidders as players, i.e. a model where it is assumed all play­
ers are behaving rationally. An appropriate model may be based on  the ideas o f Harsanyi 
(1967,1968a,b). The basic principles underlying such a model are briefly outlined in chapter 
8. It should be emphasised that many player games o f this type are immensely complex, and 
so, in order to make progress, we must look to simplify the problem somewhat.
The first step in this simplification is to look at the problems facing the tenderer and bidders 
separately. As mentioned above, the tenderers problem can be formulated as a stochastic 
control problem -  this is the subject o f chapter 7. With the problem  faced by an individual 
bidder we have two choices of approach. The problem can be modelled in a game theoretic way 
with ju st the competing bidders as players, or alternatively we can look at the problem faced 
by an individual bidder in a decision theoretic framework. The decision theoretic approach 
means we assume our competitors are behaving predictably in some sense, for example drawing 
their bids randomly from some fixed distribution. This approach is the subject o f chapters 4, 
5 and 6 .
G am e theoretic models with just the bidders as players have received some attention in the 
literature, stemming from the papers o f Griesmer 8  Shubik ( 1967a,b,c). Other contributions 
have com e from Smith 8  Case (1975), Engelbrecht-Wiggins (1980), Holt (1980) and King 
8  M ercer (1988). However the vast majority o f the bidding literature is devoted to the decision 
theoretic approach to the bidders problem, mostly revolving around the papers o f Friedman 
(1956) and Gates (1967). Chapter 3 provides a review o f  this material.
Summarising, this thesis does not consider any game theoretic models. In the main we 
concentrate on formalising and extending existing decision theoretic models for the bidder’s 
and tenderer’s problems as well as presenting new models and examining related topics. We 
shall thus now develop the basic notation and assumptions for the problem.
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The first point to note is that in order to eliminate the effects o f the different costs o f different 
contracts it is common to work in terms of a companies markup, m, rather than their bid, b. 
If we consider ourselves as assisting an individual bidder in determining their bids, then we 
define our markup as m =  b/c, the ratio of our bid to our point estimate o f the cost to us o f 
fulfilling the contract, c. We shall define the other bidders markups as the ratio o f their bid to 
our point estimate o f the cost o f  the contract, c, we thus might refer to this as our competitors 
apparent markup. It is worth noting that this definition o f markup is equivalent to defining a 
competitors markup relative to their own cost and then assuming that ourselves and all our 
competitors are using the same point estimate o f the cost o f the contract.
Our bidder’s decision problem is now to select a markup. Our actual bid will then be given 
by this markup times our estim ate o f  the cost to  us o f  fulfilling the contract. O f course the 
true cost will be a random variable, C , since at this stage the final cost will be unknown to  us.
The simplest criteria on which to  base the selection o f  our markup is to maximise immediate 
expected profit (m  -  1)E [C p (m ) ] where p(m) is the probability that we win the contract with 
markup m. This probability is clearly uncertain to us and so, as Bayesians, we must treat it as 
a random variable, indexed by m . We now make the assumption that the random variables C  
and p(m ) are independent for all values of m. In practice this means that we are assuming our 
competitors will not change their procedure for choosing a markup for contracts of different 
costs. If the sequence o f contracts have similar costs this seems a very reasonable assumption. 
With this assumption the expected profit can now be written as c ( m -  l)p (m ) where c  =  E[C] 
and p(m ) =  E[p(m)]. Thus the problem  reduces to  computing an estimate o f  p (m )- this is the 
starting point for most o f the existing models discussed in chapter 3.
As mentioned above, this thesis mainly concentrates on mathematical models. It is however 
intended that the models presented are flexible enough to allow some o f  the many practical 
problems encountered in a real bidding environment to be incorporated. In some cases this is 
actually done, and in others it is indicated how it may be done. We thus close this introduction 
to the sequential bidding problem  by mentioning a few o f these practical considerations, the 
main references here are Ward 8  Chapman (1988) and King 8  Mercer (1985).
(i)M ore realistic utilities : In the discussion above the criteria used to choose a markup 
was simply maximisation o f expected profit. In reality a bidder may wish to consider other
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properties o f a contract, for example the prestige associated with winning a given contract. Or 
he may be happy to take a smaller markup for a very costly contract. One way to overcome 
this is to define a utility taking into account the relative importance o f expected profit and 
these other features. Our markup would then be chosen to  maximise this utility. An example 
o f  such a utility is given in §4.3. If we wish to model our competitors as also reacting to 
factors such as prestige and cost we must look to build a model that can handle these factors 
as regressors in the estimation o f  p (m ). A  model o f this type is discussed in §4.5.
(ii)  Non-price factors : A  similar consideration to the above is that o f  non-price factors 
i.e. factors, other than profit, that we might wish to  consider when choosing our markup. 
A n example o f this is our available resources at the tim e o f  each contract. Clearly if we win 
a contract and do not have the available resources to  d o  the work we will incur a cost in 
employing further staff or buying more equipment in order to fulfill the contract. So the event 
o f  us winning the contract at time t, which will clearly affect our resources at time t +  1 , will 
tend to make us bid less competitively at time t +  1 as we will need a larger profit to cover any 
extra costs incurred as a result o f having less resources available. Mathematical formulation 
o f  this leads to a stochastic control problem -  a brief review o f the literature on this is given 
in chapter 3.
(iii) Seasona/ effects : Clearly, in many bidding environments, such as building works, factors 
such as tempereature and number o f  daylight hours are going to affect the number o f  contracts 
available and thus the level o f  com petition for these contracts. These seasonal effects can easily 
be incorporated into the specification o f  p (m ). This is discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.5.
(i\)Cost estimation : One o f the major problems with attempting to model a competitors 
behaviour is that the variability in their cost estimate can sometimes swamp subtle changes 
in their markup policy. Some authors have gone as far as concerning themselves more with 
estimating the cost that a competitor is likely to come up with than with their markup, see 
for example Naert 8  Weverbergh (1978). In chapter 5 we present a model which attempts to 
overcome this by seperating the variability in cost, and that in markup.
(v ) ‘one off’ information about competitors : It is com m on for a bidder to obtain informa­
tion about competitors other than that found out simply from  their bidding behaviour. For 
example it may be discovered that a com petitor is in financial difficulty, or has a problem with
resources. Information o f this kind is clearly im portant in determining a bid  as it will affect 
a competitors behaviour. It is thus desirable that models have the ability to incorporate this 
type o f information. This is discussed in §4.5 in relation to the models o f  chapter 4.
(vi) The tenderer’s non-price criteria : Clearly if it is believed that the tenderer is not 
neccessarily going to  award the contract to  the lowest bidder, this will have a significant effect 
on the estimation o f  p(m ). Ward 8  Chapman (1988) discuss this point in detail. However 
for contracts o f a reasonable size and importance it is very likely that a tenderer would have 
sufficient knowledge o f potential bidders to  only invite companies to bid  whom  he was sure 
would be capable o f  fulfilling the contract satisfactorily. If we assume this to  be the case then 
there is no reason to  suppose that the tenderer would not award the contract to the lowest 
bidder. We shall assume this to be the case throughout the thesis.
1 .2  Schem ata .
This thesis essentially divides into four parts. Chapters 2 and 3 provide background and 
review material. Chapters 4 and 5 present two types o f  decision theoretic models for the bidders 
problem. Chapter 6 then examines the relationship between these two types o f model and 
develops some interesting theoretical asides. Finally chapter 7 looks at the decision theoretic 
approach to the tenderers problem.
One o f the main tools in any sequential decision model is likely to be tim e series analysis and 
accordingly chapter 2 is devoted to reviewing standard Bayesian time series models which are 
then used in chapters 4,5 and 7. As mentioned above, chapter 3 provides a  review of existing 
decision theoretic models for the bidders problem.
The first part o f chapter 4, sections 4.1-4.3, formalises one o f these decision theoretic models, 
the Gates model, and develops it into a sequential m odel. Section 4.4 develops a multivariate 
analogue to one o f  the time series models mentioned in chapter 2 and §4.5 then applies this to 
the model described earlier in chapter 4 to provide a powerful sequential version of the Gates 
model. Similarly chapter 5 produces a sequential version o f  another model discussed in chapter 
3, the Friedman model.
Chapter 6 examines the relationship between the Gates and Friedman models and as a result 
o f  this defines and characterises a new class o f  finitely additive distributions.
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The tenderers decision problem is formulated in chapter 7 and shown to be a generalisation 
o f the standard m ulti-armed bandit problem (M A B P). The M ABP is then reviewed and an 
attempt to extend the solution ideas for the M ABP to the more general tenderers problem is 
given.
Chapter 8 then addresses some issues that there has not been time to develop in the main 
part o f the thesis.
Finally it is worth noting that in a thesis such as this which addresses the same basic problem 
from  a number o f different viewpoints it is essential to get clear in ones mind exactly which 
problem is being tackled in each chapter. Thus at the begining o f chapters 4,5,6 and 7 a sort 
o f  mini introduction is provided to clarify the assumptions used, the problem addressed and 
the likely applicability o f  the model described in that chapter.
2 . A  R E V I E W  O F  B A Y E S I A N  T I M E  S E R I E S  M O D E L S
2.1 T h e B a yes ia n  A p p r o a c h  to  T im e  Series A n a ly sis .
The classical ARIM A time series models o f Box 8  Jenkins (1970) work on the idea that 
a series can be modelled by first detecting and removing non-stationary components, such 
as trend and seasonality, and modelling the resulting stationary series as a sum o f random 
variables, which they later assume to  be normal. T w o practical criticisms can be levelled at 
these models. Firstly, any attempt to move away from the normality o f  the components in 
the model for the stationary series will lead to problem s o f tractability in the model fitting. 
And secondly, the attempt to remove all the features o f the series before any modelling takes 
place does not allow any room for heuristic reasoning in the model building process, which 
would be very desirable if the modeller had a good knowledge of a particular series. A  further 
more general, but related, criticism is that the m odels are too rigid and do not easily allow an 
operator to incorporate any extra information he may receive as the model is running.
These problems led practicioners to  develop an alternative class o f Bayesian time series 
models. Bather (1965) proposed a class o f non-norm al state space models which he showed 
to be fully tractable. A  very flexible normal state space model, the Dynamic Linear Model 
(DLM ), was introduced by Harrison 8  Stevens (1976) as follows. An observed series {Y t }  
is related via a linear model to an underlying markov series { 0, }  which has some heuristic 
meaning and is consequently known as the state, or level, o f the series. This is summarised in 
the equations below,
Observation equation : Yt — F t0t +  V, V, ~  W (0 ,V ) (2.1.1)
System equation : 0, =  G t0 ,_ , +  W , W , ~  Y (0 ,W )  (2.1.2)
the error components V, and W , are independent, w ith the values o f V  and W  being prespec­
ified. The vector F , is a known vector o f  regressors as in the ordinary static linear model, and 
the matrix G , is a known state transition matrix which can be used to model factors such as 
growth trend and seasonality. The analysis o f the model proceeds as follows.
Let D, denote all the data up to and including tim e t, and take the prior distribution 
0, - ,  - N( m , . , , C , _ , )
then (2.1 .1 ) and (2 .1 .2) give
#, |D,_, ~  JV(a,,Rf ) 
t ,  | Dt ~  fV (m ,, C ,)
where the updated values m t, C t are given by the Kalman filter equations, Kalman (1963), as 
follows,
a, =  G ,m , !
R , =  G « C ,_ iG ^  +  W  (2.1.3)
m , =  a , 4- s, e ,/(F ,r R ,F , + V )
C , =  R , -  8,s,77 (F ,r R ,F , +  V )
with st =  R ( F t and et =  Yt — F ^ a ( . Kalman originally derived these equations for updating 
the first two cumulants o f $t without distributional assumptions. Harrison 8  Stevens showed 
that they were also the appropriate equations with the state vector and observations being 
normal. Harrison 8  Stevens then go on to provide full forecast distributions for {Y t+k | Dt- 1 ) .
An important special case is when F e =  G , =  I , the identity m atrix, for all t. This is 
called the steady model since the evolution on 0t given by (2 .1 .2) results in its mean remaining 
unchanged but its variance growing at a constant rate. Smith 8  Miller (1986) develop a non­
normal steady model, with a multiplicative system equation, similar to one given by Bather 
(1965). They then apply this model to the prediction o f records.
Ameen 8  Harrison (1985) discussed the difficulty o f specifying a value for W . First they 
noted that the updating from C ,_ i  —* R , in (2.1.3) simply has the effect o f  increasing the 
variance components o f C t_ i-  They then showed that for the normal DLM  the updating given 
by
R , =  B ( G |C t-  i G,r B,
where B , is a diagonal discount matrix whose elements are all greater than 1, is formally 
identical to the updating from C ,_ ,  -♦ R , in (2.1.3). Smith (1988) has taken these ideas 
further and shown that when G , =  I  this updating, which he refers to as a spread steady 
model, is a sound method for representing dissolution o f information in non-norm al models. 
This will prove very useful in §2.3.
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The DLM overcomes many o f the limitations of o f the AR IM A  models. The series is modelled 
directly which positively encourages input from an informed modeller, both in the model 
specifications and via intervention when the model is running. Extensions away from the 
normality assumptions are the subject o f the following two sections.
The next section reviews an evolution on the state 0, that is simply applicable to all distri­
butions and is in all important respects the same as the steady model described above. In §2.3 
we review the Dynamic Generalised Linear Model which attempts to generalise the full DLM 
to non-normal distributions.
2 .2  T he P o w e r  S tea d y  M od e l.
Consider first the steady DLM where 0, is a univariate parameter. The observation equation 
(2 .1 .1 ) is clearly equivalent to saying
Y, \0t ~  N (0t ,V )
which can easily be generalised to non-normal likelihoods for Yt \0t . The crux o f the model 
however is the evolution o f the parameter 0t , that is
t*\D t —* 0t+\ I D, (2.2.1)
In the steady DLM this is given by the additive equation (2.1.2) which, with a normal dis­
tribution on 0t , presents no problems as normality is preserved under addition. However if 
0, is non-normal, an additive equation such as (2 .1 .2) presents problems o f  tractability in 
computing the distribution o f 0t+ ,  | Dt .
Smith (1979) took the view that rather than state the form o f  the evolution (2.2.1) and then 
examine its consequences, one should define the properties one wants an evolution to have and 
then look for a transformation on the density o f 0t \Dt that has these properties. Smith chose 
to define his desired properties on a decision space associated w ith  the parameter 0t as follows,
(1) The Bayes decision, with respect to any step loss function, on the random variable 
0t+i\Dt should be the same as the Bayes decision on the random variable 0t \D,
(2) If 0,\Dt has a unimodal density, then the expected loss, with a step loss function, of a 
Bayes decision on 0,+ I |D, should be at least as large as the expected loss o f the same 
Bayes decision on 0t \ Dt
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These properties effectively define what Smith means by a steady evolution on 9t . Smith 
then proves that the only transformation on the density o f 9t \Dt to satisfy these properties, as 
well as some regularity conditions, is o f  the form
/ ,  + l (*«+ , |D.) a  [ / , ( * ,  | D ,)]k* 0 <  fc, <  1 for all t ( 2 .2 .1)
where f t+l is the p.d.f. o f tff+ 1 |D, and / ,  is the p.d.f. o f 9t \Dt . Smith called the process 
0, undergoing the evolution (2.2 .1 ) a power steady model, and if k, =  k  for all t he called it 
a simple power steady model. One feature o f the model is that, unlike a model using a well 
defined system equation, it does not provide the joint distribution across {9 t+ i,0 t  I D t}-  At 
first sight this may appear to be a deficiency o f  the model. However Smith & Miller (1986) 
and Smith (1988,89a) argue that this is not so, pointing out that the crux is that the model 
provides well defined forecast distributions across observables.
In practical terms the model is very useful as the evolution (2.2.1) is easily applicable to 
non-normal distributions on 9,. It is also very flexible in that the evolution can be applied to 
transformations o f the parameterisation o f 9, ,  allowing the evolution to be applied to natural 
parameterisations. For example in §4.1 the evolution (2.2.1) is applied to a multivariate logistic 
transform o f a set o f probabilities.
An interesting property is that, unlike the steady DLM, the evolution (2.2.1) does not 
neccesarily imply that E[0,+1 \ Dt\ =  E[0, | Dt\, it is however always true that mode [0,+ j | D t] =  
mode [9, \ D t ].
Smith (1981) develops these ideas to  a multivariate parameter The natural extension is 
to take an evolution o f the form
/ ,♦ . ( * « ■  I A )  « [ / , ( * ,  |D,)]* 0 < * < 1
which is perfectly valid but has the slightly restrictive implication that 9['] | }  undergoes
a simple power steady evolution with the same value o f k for each i, 0J' 1 being the i ,h element 
of
For situations where it is believed that this symmetrical development on the elements o f  0t is 
inappropriate, Smith proposed the stacked steady model as follows. First reorder the elements 
o f 9,, (tfj1* , . . .  ,0 {n|) —* (9} , . . .  ,9 " )  say, such that we believe information about 0j+1 is lost
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quicker than information about 9\ for * =  1 , . . .  , n -  1. The stacked steady model is now 
defined by letting 0\ |0J + 1, . . .  ,0 "  develop with a simple power steady model with discount 
factor k, for i  =  1 , . . .  , n, where 0 < k, <  k,+ ! <  1 , i  =  1 , . . .  , n -  1 .
2.3  T h e  D y n a m ic  G e n e ra lise d  L in ea r M o d e l.
In this section we review the Dynamic Generalised Linear Model (D G LM ) as proposed by 
West, Harrison © M igon (1985). The DGLM  attempts to generalise the full DLM, as defined 
by (2.1.1) and (2 .1 .2 ), to  non-normal distributions on the observed series and the state. The 
price that has to be paid to make this generalisation work is that the state 0t is modelled as 
a second order process, i.e. only information about its first tw o cumulants is maintained, and 
no distributional assumptions are made. The model does however provide a full distribution 
across the observables {V -, } .  The model is defined as follows.
In place o f the observation equation (2.1.1) observations are assumed to come from an 
exponential family likelihood as follows,
p{Y, \ r )tA )  oc czp{<t>(ritYt -  a ( q , ) ) }  (2.3.1)
where % is the natural parameter for Yt . The system equation is as before i.e.
(2.3.2)
but now the distribution o f W , is unspecified. The parameters q, and 0t are connected via 
the guide relationship
g(nt ) =  F f0 ,  (2.3.3)
where g(.) is a known function, quite possibly g (x ) =  z , and F f is a known vector as in the 
DLM.
The priors on rjt_ l and 0,_ i are as follows,
rh - l \Dt. l ^ C P [ c . l ,0 i . l } (2.3.4)
~  ( m - i . C , . » ]  (2 3 .5 )
where CP[.,.\  denotes the conjugate prior for the likelihood (2.3.1) which has p.d.f.
p (q) oc ezp{ar\ -  /?a (q )} (2.3.6)
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Equation (2.3.5) does not specify a full distribution for 0t~i | A - i  but simply says it has 
cumulants given by
E [# ,- »  | A - i ]  =  m , - i
V a r [# ,_ » !  I V , ]  =  C ,_ ,
The development (2.3.2) on 0 ,- i  gives
r,, \ D t.t  ~ C P [ a ; , ^ ]  (2.3.7)
0, | D ,_ ,  ~  [ a , ,R , ) (2.3.8)
where
at =  G ,m ( - j  (2.3.9)
R, = B ,G ,C ,_  ,G ^ B ,
Note that the updating from C t_ i —• R ,  is achieved by using a discount matrix B t , which, as 
noted in §2 .1 , is a perfectly sound m ethod for representing dissolution of information about 0t 
in this non-normal environment.
In order to obtain the values of , 0', one can use the guide relation (2.3.3) as follows. Define
/ ,  = F f a ,  (2.3.11)
q, =  R ,F ,
then from (2.3.7) compute E[g(r;t ) | D t-  i } and Var\g(qt ) \ Dt - 1 ] m  functions o f ci't ,0't . It is 
then clear, that by taking the mean and variance o f each side o f (2.3.3) and equating them, 
that the following equations can be used to solve for a j , 0\ as functions of a , , R ( , f t and qt .
V [g (n ,)\ D t- l ) =  f ,  (2.3.12)
V a r ia n t)  I Dt- 1] =  qt
Consider now updating the parameters a't ,0't ,a t and R , in the light o f an observation Yt , 
hence obtaining the updates for the distributions r)t I Dt and 0,\ Dt -
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Substituting these into (2.3.14) gives
*“ » = • «  +  s ,(g , -  f t )/qt (2.3.15)
C , =  R , -  (8t8,r ) ( l  -  P,q,)/q,
where g, =  E[0(»j( ) | D tJ and pt =  Var[g(t},) | D t] which can be computed from  the full distri­
bution o f tf, I D, given in (2.3.13).
The full scheme o f  updating parameters is given in figure 2.3.16.
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•h , I D ,- , ~ C P\at - ¡ .f it -  i| 8, - ,  |P,-. ~  [ m ,- „ C ,- , ]  Y
FIG U R E 2.3.16
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2.4 T h e B e ta -B in o m ia l D G L M .
In this section we review a specific DGLM , the Beta-Binomial. The reason for this is to 
provide a background for sections 4.4 and 4.5 which are devoted to developing and applying a 
multivariate analogue to this model.
The model is specified as follows. Observations come from the likelihood 
p(Yt | Mi, n ,) =  (y t) ^ ' ( l  “  /**)"'_r*
=  ( y ( ) e iP { y ' lo8 J*~~ )  +  n‘ ' ^ i 1 _  M*) } (2.4.1)
which, by comparison with the exponential family likelihood (2.3.1), immediately gives the 
natural parameterisation as
If one now takes the guide function, </(.), to be the identity, i.e. g (x )  =  x ,  then the model is 
specified by
fi, =  G « * ,- !  +  W ,
which can be described as a dynamic version o f the standard logisitic-linear regression model.
The conjugate prior for ij, in the likelihood (2.4.1) is the Logistic-Beta distribution, 
L B e(a t ,0 t ), with p.d.f.
and cumulants
p{Vt I a , ,0 t ) = r (o< +  0t) e-""
r (a,)r (A ) (i + «”•)“•+<’1
E[»?«] =  •?(<*«) -  7 (A )
V a r (t i ,)  =  7(at) + 7(A)
where 7  is the digamma function and 7  the trigamma function defined by 
7 (a ) =  ^  log T (a)
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Also one can compute
mode(rit ) =  log
and the curvature o f p(tj, | at ,0 t ) at the mode as 
Qi A
<*t +  0t
Refering to figure 2.3.16, assume we have set and hence obtained a t ,R ,  and,
from the guide relationship, f t and qt . The next task is to obtain a', and 0[ by solving
/ ,  =  7 ( 4 )  -  7 ( t f )
Qt =  +  7  ( # )
this however requires numerical solution. So West et. al., pointing out that the guide relation 
really is just a guide, suggest, as an approximation, taking / ,  as the mode o f r), \ D t-  1 and qt 
as the inverse o f  the curvature o f p[r)t \ Dt - i )  at the mode. This gives the simple formula
=  - ( l  +  e 'O  
Qt
«  =  i ( i +  . - '• )
Moving down figure 2.3.16 the updating from to at ,(3t is given by
a , =  aj +  Yt 
0, =  f i  +  n, -  Y,
Note that this appears slightly inconsistent with figure 2.3.16, this is simply due to using the 
parameterisation a t ,0 t to make the Logistic-Beta be in its standard form. To be consistent 
with figure 2.3.16 we would have to use the parameterisation a , ,  (a , +  0t)/nt-
The values for gt and p, are given by
9t =  7(<*«) -  7 (ß t) 
Pt =  7(<*,) +  7(/9.)
All other updating is as in figure 2.3.16.
17
An interesting special case occurs when G , =  I  and F , is the same for tw o succesive time 
periods. In this case one way o f modelling a dynamic development directly on ijt would be to 
use the power steady model, resulting in the updating
a't =  k ,a t-  i
It is easily shown that, in this special case, the Beta-Binomial DGLM is equivalent to the 
power steady model with
_  V a r ^ - i l D t - i )  
*  V a r f o l D , - ! )  
F T C t_ 1F 
"  F T B ,C « _ ,B ,F
where F  is the com m on value o f F ,_  t and F f .
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3 . A  R E V I E W  O F  D E C I S I O N  T H E O R E T I C  B I D D I N G  M O D E L S
As noted in chapter 1 the two main models proposed are due to Friedman (1956) and Gates 
(1967). It should be emphasised that both these models were proposed primarily for bidding 
on one-off contracts, and not for sequential bidding.
The mathematical framework in which both these models exist is as follows. We represent 
company, or firm, 0, F0, competing against companies Fi t . .. ,F „ .  A s described in chapter 1 
our task is to compute p (m ), an estimate o f p (m ), where
p(m ) =  P (we win the contract with markup m)
The Friedman and Gates models both propose p(m ) should be expressed as a function o f 
P i(m ),. . .  ,p n(m ), where p ,(m ) is an estimate o f
Pi(m ) =  P (w e ‘beat’ Ft with markup m )
precisely what is meant by ‘beats’ is discussed in a moment. Explicitly, the Friedman model 
proposes,
p H  =  f l P ' N  (3 1 )
and the Gates model proposes,
#( m) - <s2)  
The merits o f these two models have been discussed extensively in the literature, resulting 
in a supposed controversy as to which is best to use. Before mentioning some o f the main 
contributions to this controversy it is worth highlighting an unfortunate recurring trait of 
papers in this area. Most authors feel they have to answer the question “which o f Gates’ or 
Friedman’s formulae is right ?” . Surely this is the wrong question to  be asking. Almost any 
formula can be deemed to be right if we make the appropriate assumptions. The questions 
should be, firstly - which assumptions vindicate the Friedman formula and which the Gates 
formula ? and, secondly - which o f these assumptions are most likely to be appropriate in our 
given situation ? One o f the aims o f §4.1 is to isolate the underlying modelling assumptions 
and implications if the Gates formula is to be valid, so that the practitioner can determine 
whether or not it is appropriate to use it. This point has also been made by King © Mercer 
(1987,88) who attempt to isolate the assumptions underlying the Friedman and Gates models 
from a more practical viewpoint.
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Attem pts to  answer the question o f whether the Friedman or Gates formula is right, have 
been both  experimental (i.e. based on performance in simulation) and theoretical. Theoretical 
attempts to  ‘prove’ the Gates formula right have come from Rosenshine (1972), who also 
provides a good  review o f the controversy, and Dixie (1974). However Fuerst (1976) has 
highlighted errors in both these proofs. Fuerst goes on to make some interesting points about 
the Gates formula, which we mention in a moment.
Gates (1976) and Benjamin 8  Meador (1979) have performed simulations to  try to justify 
formula (3.2). The Gates simulation was summarily dismissed by Fuerst (1977). Benjamin 
8  Meadors simulation was very similar to  Gates’ and so many o f  Fuerst’s criticisms also apply 
here. They also failed to take in to account the comments made by Fuerst (1976), on what 
might be a correct application o f  the Gates model. It is worth noting that in all o f these 
simulations the Gates model performed significantly better than the Friedman model.
Before commenting further on (3.1) and (3.2) we define two sets o f  random variables. Let X , 
be a random variable representing the bid made by company *', * =  1 . . .  n, on  a given contract. 
Also, for a markup m, define the random variable 0, (m ) by
0j(m ) =  p(Fi wins the contract| we use markup m)
We can thus m odel the problem by working with either the vector o f bids X  =  ( X i , . . .X n ) 
or the vector o f  probabilities 8(m ) =  (0o (m ) , . . .  , 0n( m ) ), that is, in practice, start by putting 
a prior on  either o f  X  or tf(m). In §4.1 we show that the Gates formula (3.2) follows directly 
from a Dirichlet prior on #(m ).
The Friedman formula (3.1) clearly arises from  putting independent priors on X l t . . .  , X n 
and interpreting Pi(m ) as p(cm  <  X i) ,  where c  is our point estimate o f the cost o f  the contract 
to us.
The above comments on the Friedman and Gates models lead us to make the following 
definitions. A  ‘ Friedman type' model is one which puts a prior directly on the random variable 
X . Whilst a ‘ G ates type’ model is one which puts a prior directly on 0(m ).
Thus chapter 4 presents a sequential Gates type model, and chapter 5 presents a sequential 
Friedman type model.
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Gates’ own justification for his model was as follows. Assume that com pany F, has a, balls 
in an urn, and that the contract is awarded by drawing a ball at random from  the urn. Then 
p(m ) =  * o /5 Z r«o  *•» where *o »■ the number o f balls we have in the urn. If the relar 
tionship Pi(m ) =  *0/(*o  +  * .) ,  is assumed, Gates’ formula follows by substituting =  
*o (l -  P i[m ))/pi(m ), in the formula for p (m ).
This justification inspired Fuerst (1976) to make the correct, and indeed obvious, deduction 
that if we know the exact distribution o f  X l t . . .  , X n then p ,(m ) should be interpreted as
p, (m ) =  P (F 0 beats Ft w ith markup m | F0 or F, win the contract)
=  P (cm  <  X i  | F0 or Fi win the contract)
Since with this interpretation the Gates formula is a probabilistic identity. This interpre­
tation o f P i(m ) is also obvious from  the formalisation in §4.1. It is however at odds with the 
interpretation originally intended by Gates and used by Gates (1976) and Benjamin 8  Meador 
(1979) in their simulations. In these they simply took Pi(m ) =  P (cm  <  X i) .  For fixed m use 
o f  this interpretation o f  p ,(m ) is equivalent to assuming that the event o f  F0 beating F, is in­
dependent o f the performance o f  F0 and Fi relative to  the other bidders. In chapter 6 , theorem 
6.1.4, it is proved that, provided P (X i  =  X , )  =  0, there is no countably additive distribution 
across X , , X ,  such that for all *  in a given range P (x  <  X t ) =  P (x  <  X , \ X i <  X } ). We 
can thus conclude that Gates’ formula is never a probabilistic identity, for all m, with Gates’ 
original interpretation o f Pi(m ).
Decision theoretic models other than those o f  Friedman and Gates have com e from, amongst 
others, Agnew (1972), Curtis 6  Maines (1974), Attanasi 8  Johnson (1975), Gunter 8  Swanson 
(1978), Carr (1982) and Knode 8  Swanson (1987). Agnew is one o f the few to specifically 
tackle the sequential problem. He uses a novel non-parametric approach which starts with 
just a point estimate o f the maximum o f  the profit function (m  -  l)p (m ). This estimate is 
then sequentially updated using techniques o f  stochastic approximation. The only information 
required for the updating is whether or not we win each contract.
Curtis 8  Maines and Carr claim  to  have broken free from  the influence o f  the Friedman 
and Gates models by placing much more emphasis on the variability o f each competitors cost 
estimates. Claim ing, perhaps justifiably, that in many cases this variability is more important
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than variability in markup in accounting for variability in the final bid. However in both these 
papers the m ethods used to com pute our probability o f winning rely on the independence of 
competitors b ids  and in principle differ little from  the Friedman approach.
The papers o f  Attanasi 8  Johnson, Gunter 8  Swanson and Knode 8  Swanson are repre- 
sentitive o f  a different, and important, approach to the problem. Their main thrust is that 
non-price factors  such as a com petitors resources are at least as important as profit in de­
termining a com petitors bid. They thus formulate a stochastic control model to maximise 
expected profit up  to some finite horizon, given that when a contract is won this will affect a 
competitors ability to bid competitively at future time periods.
Non-price factors  such as resources are discussed in more detail in Ward 8  Chapman (1988) 
and King 8  M ercer (1985).
An extensive bibliography containing over 500 references on all aspects o f the bidding prob­
lem has been com piled by Stark 8  Rothkopf (1979). Most o f  the references however relate 
to very specific bidding environments such as defence or oil industry contracts, and tend to 
recommend very  tailor made bidding procedures, relying little on general mathematical models.
Ultimately it is o f  course desirable to incorporate aspects o f o f these tailor made procedures, 
as well as n on -p rice  considerations, in to the more mathematical models. One o f the features 
o f the m odel in chapter 4 is that, although primarily a mathematical model, its framework 
does permit incorporation o f other information. This is discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.5.
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4 . A  S E Q U E N T I A L  G A T E S  T Y P E  M O D E L
In this chapter we assume ourselves to  be assisting an individual bidder in determining his 
bids on a sequence o f contracts. T h e basic assumptions are those outlined in chapter 1, namely 
that C  II p(m ), and that the tenderer will award the contract to the bidder making the lowest 
markup.
The model outlined in sections 4.1 to  4.3 and generalised in sections 4.4 and 4.5 can work 
on the assumption that the only information our bidder receives after each contract is the 
value o f the lowest markup, or bid , made by the other bidders. The identity o f the winner 
when we do not win can be incorporated, but is not needed in updating our estimate o f p (m ). 
Other information, such as the identity o f  the other bidders or the actual values o f their bids, 
is not used in the model as stated. However the model could be extended to incorporate such 
information. Thus, as it stands, this model would be useful in an environment where we would 
not expect to receive much information in the aftermath o f a contract being awarded.
4.1 A  F orm alisa tion  o f  th e  G a te s  M o d e l.
In the last chapter Gates’ own justification for his model was described. In this section we 
construct distributional assumptions which lead to Gates’ formula and confirm Fuerst’s obser­
vations about the interpretation o f  the probabilities p, (m ). These distributional assumptions 
are then shown to lead naturally to  a sequential version o f the Gates model. In the next sec­
tion it is shown how this sequential m odel is easily extended to a simple power steady model 
o f the form discussed in chapter 2. In §4.3 ways o f incorporating some o f  problems faced by 
practicioners in to this model are discussed, methods for setting prior parameters are given, 
and finally there is an illustrative example.
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 show how the model can be further extended to a Dynamic Generalised 
Linear Model, allowing modelling and on line estimation o f  seasonal and regressor effects.
The first step in our formalisation o f  the Gates model is to define our random variables. For 
a given markup m let
9, (m ) =  p(Fi wins the contract | we use markup m ) i  =  0 , . . .  , n
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tf(m) =  ( 0o (m ) t . . .  , 0n(m )) is simply an unknown parameter vector, and so, as in any Bayesian 
analysis, we start by putting a prior distribution on it. Since som ebody must win, 
$3"_o 0%(m) =  1- Thus consider the prior,
(♦ o (m ),i| (m ),.. .  . » „ H - P K H . a . H , . , .  , a r (m )) (4.1.1)
where P ((a 0(m ), a , (m ) , . . .  ,a n (m )) represents the Dirichlet distribution with parameters 
a 0(m ) ,a i ( m ) , . . .  ,a „ (m ) .  O f course p (m ) =  0o (m ),  and the natural estimate of 0o (m ) is 
its expectation, thus take
« " » >  =  E[»„(m)| =  (4.1.2)
2_».=o a '
Suppressing the dependancy on the index m for the tim e being, we now transform to new 
parameters.
Let fa  =  Oo/{0o +  ^i)i then it is easily shown that (V>,,1 — fa )  ~  P (ao><Xi), i-e a 
Beta distribution (see De G root (1970) ), so E[V»i] =  a 0 /(oco +  « . )  =  fa , say, where fa  is an 
estimate o f fa . Therefore, transforming to new parameters fa , ct, =  a 0( l  — fa )/ fa , substituting 
this in to (4.1.2) yields
P M  =  E(*„] =  i l  +  £  j  (4 1 3 )
Notice that fa has the role ofp< in Gates’ formula (3 .2). To interpret fa (m )  is thus to interpret 
Pi(m ) in the Gates formula.
Clearly since fa  — 0o/(0o +  0<) we have, directly from  the definition o f  the 0’s,
^  .  _  P(F0 wins contract)
p(F0 or Fi wins the contract)
=  p{Fo wins the contract | F0 or F, wins the contract) (4-1-4)
So as Fuerst(1976) points out, the Gates formula is valid provided P i(m ) is interpreted as 
fa (m )  above. We note this is not the usual interpretation o f  p ,(m ). To obtain these values in 
a practical environment, we must ask the question, “ G iven only us or com pany « can now win 
the contract, what is the probability that we win ? ” .
We can thus conclude that Gates’ formula is consistent with a Dirichlet distribution on 0(m ). 
The Dirchlet assumption (4.1.1) suggests a way in w hich the record o f  success of the com pa­
nies F i , . . .  , Fn in previous similar contracts can be incorporated to obtain improved estimates
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o f E[0O]- T o motivate this process, assume first that we always chose the same markup m.
Initially choose a 0 ,o ii , ■ ■. ,a n so that they are consistent with our beliefs about p ,(m ). How 
this might be done in practice is discussed in §4.3. Now consider the award o f  the contract as a 
Bernoulli trial with n +  1 types o f  success 0 ,1 . . .  , n. A  type » success occurs with probability 
0, and is equivalent to company F, winning the contract. Thus
So the relevant probabilities can be updated directly once we learn who won the last contract.
We have now established how, for fixed m, we can update the probabilities p (m ) and p ,(m ) 
when we know the identity o f the winner, F* say, o f the last contract. In order that we 
can update these probabilities for all m, suppose we are told that after all the bids had 
been submitted, the lowest markup made by our competitors was m ‘ , and that the identity 
o f the com petitor using this markup was F*. We now know that for all fixed markups m 
less than m ' we would have won the contract, and thus would have the following updating, 
a£(m ) =  a 0(m ) +  1 and a ‘ (m ) =  ati(m) for all t /  0. And for all fixed markups m greater 
than m* we would have, o£ (m ) =  a * (m ) +  1 and a *(m ) =  a¿(m ) for all « /  k. Suppressing 
the index m on a 0, . . .  ,a n we therefore have the following updating for our probabilities:
(4.1.5)
where r, is the number o f type » successes, or equivalently,
f 1 if company i  has 
( 0 otherwise
x won
Clearly p(0  | r )  oc p (r  | O)p(0) thus from  (4.1.1) and (4.1.5)
(#(m) | r) ~  P K ( m ) ,a ;( m ) ,. .. ,o;(m )) (4.1.6)
where o* (m ) =  a, (m ) +  r, , in particular,
and,
m <  m"
m >  m ‘
(4.1.7)
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(4.1.8)[q0 +  1 ] /  [oo +  <*i +  1 ]
m > m ‘
and the full distribution o f 0(m ) can be updated from
<*o (m ) — a0(m ) +  1
a ,(m ) =  a, (m)
a 0(m ) =  a0( 
o<.(m) =  a,(m ) m > m ‘
A practical problem arises if we are only told the value o f  the winning markup, rather than 
m * . Although we can use the updating in (4.1.7) and (4.1.8) when we do not win the contract, 
if  we do win, with a bid m ' 11 say, we know only that m* >  m '11. Clearly updating o f p (m ) is 
unaffected for m < m 111, otherwise, we may have to opt for the overly conservative updating 
obtained by setting m* =  m*1’ .
It has been shown that if we know the value of our competitors’ lowest markup after each 
contract, it is only neccesary to estim ate p ,(m ) at the first time period. From then on p(m ) 
and p,(m ) can be updated directly, given only the minimal information o f our competitors 
lowest markup and the identity o f  the company making this markup -  information which is 
often easily accessible.
To obtain an understanding o f how this model works in the long run, it is helpful to consider 
the behaviour o f p (m ) and p ,(m ) as the number, N , o f our competitors best markups we have 
observed gets large. Let these markups be denoted by m \, . . .  , m 'N , and assume that none are 
equal, so, without loss o f generality, w e can assume they are ordered i.e. m\ <  m j < , . . . ,  < 
m'N Repeated application o f (4.1.7) yields
for r =  0 , . . .  ,N ,  where we define =  - o o  and + , =  + oo . As N  gets large we have,
i.e. the probability that we win with a markup in the range (m ’ , m‘ + , ) ,  tends to the proportion 
o f  times we would have won, if we had used a markup in this range at all time periods. This is 
a pleasingly sensible result, and fits in well with Gates’ original interpretation o f his model. We 
also note that var(0o ) ~  r (N  -  r)/N 2(N  + 1 )  as N  gets large, thus var(0o ) —» 0 as TV —» oo. So
m  €  (ro;>ro; + i)
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we can state the stronger result that the random variable 0o tends to (N  -r )/ N ,  in probability, 
as N  —* oo. We also find,
Pi(m  | m ; , . . .  ,m % ) ~ N  - r  
N  +  R, -  r
m  €  (rn‘ ,m ’ + l)
where R, is the number o f contracts that company « would have won, if we had used a markup 
in the range (m ; ,m ;+1) at every time period. Thus 5Z"=i f t  =  r> since N  -  r contracts would 
have been won by us. Exactly analogous results pertain if  som e o f the observed markups are 
identical.
One suprising feature o f the updating formula (4.1.7) is that p(m ) can be updated without 
knowing the identity o f  our best competitor on each contract so far. Thus, one implication of 
the Dirichlet model is that given no other information abou t our competitors, the sequence 
o f  their lowest bids on  each contract is sufficient for the prediction o f p (m ). However, if 
as is usual, we expect to gain information about who else has been invited to quote for a 
particular contract, then the identities o f  those com petitors making winning bids is crucial to 
our updated probability p(m ). For example if we have been told that we are only competing 
against companies Fi t . . .  , Fk, k <  n, then we have im plicitly been told that ,F n
cannot win. Thus when working with the distribution o f  0o (m ) , . . .  ,0*(m ) we must condition 
on the event Y  =  {tffc+1 (m ) =  0 , . . .  ,0 „ (m ) =  0 ) . From De G root (1970) we have
(0o (m ) , . . .  ,0k(m ) | Y )  ~  P (a Z (m ) ,. .  . , a ; ( m ) )
where currently # (m ) ~  P (a jJ (m ),... ,a * (m )) . So in particular, when we have observed a 
number o f markups, the probability that F0 wins is now given by
p(m  | Y )  = Qk) +  So
+  s . )
where S, is the total number o f contracts won so far by F ,. T h is illustrates how different types 
o f  information can be utilised to improve p (m ), as emphasised by Ward 8  Chapman (1988).
4.2 A  Steady M o d el Version.
An important practical problem in estimating probabilities is that the policies o f  competing 
companies are likely to  drift with time, see Ward 8  Chapm an (1988). Possible reasons for
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this are changes in management personnel or management policy, or a com pany diversifying
its interests. Because o f  this, a competitor’s behaviour on more recent contracts is often more 
relevant for making predictions about its future behaviour than what it did in the distant past. 
In the last model we have implicitly assumed that probabilities Oi(m) are static, i.e. they do 
not change with time. This leads, for exam ple, to the unrealistic belief that given a large 
enough N  we can be almost certain about our chances o f winning with a given markup m. We 
can model the probability 0(t)  steadily changing over time by using the Simple Power Steady 
Model o f  chapter 2. i.e. take
where k  €  (0,1], and /» ( . )  is the p.d.f o f 0 (t) \ . at time t. Note, for convenience we are now 
indexing 0 by time, t, although it is still o f  course a function o f m. This developm ent means 
that individual decisions associated with 0 are unchanged. However any uncertainty associated 
with these decisions will increase at each time period. O f course if  k =  1 we have the static 
case considered previously. For general k  it is easily checked that this developm ent implies
. , . . . .  _  f  [fca0 +  2 -  fc] /  [3 -  2k +  k (a0 +  a*)] m  <  m*
’ ' t  +  1 -  fc] /  [2(1 -  k) +  rj +  Ar(a0 +  a*)] m >  m ’
To obtain a better understanding of how this model operates we now look at its behaviour 
in the long run, when the discount is constant between contracts. For a given m , after T  
contracts, the updating in (4.2.3) gives
/.♦ »(•(*+ 1) I r(0) «  [/«(*(<) I r(t))]fc (4.2.1)
(#(l + l ) | r ( « ) ) ~ P (  *«(«) + ! - * ) (4.2.2)
( 9(t +  1) I r(t +  1) ) ~  P (k a ( t )  +  r (t  +  1 ) +  1 -  * ) (4.2.3)
the analogues o f (4.1.7) and (4.1.8) are,
p {m  I m ") = [fcoio +  2 -  k] /  [1 +  (n  +  1)(1  -  *:) +  kJ2?=o a<] m  <  m ‘
[fca0 +  1 -  k] /  [1 +  (n +  1)(1  -  *:) +  *£,"=0  “ •] m  >  m ‘
and
where
1 if company i  has won the contract at time t 
0 otherwise
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Therefore as T  —► oo
(4.2.4)
and thus
p (m ,T ) =  E [« „ ( r ) ]  = M I )
^ r . o V r o j T - t )
ET-o M T) l + n  +  ( l - t ) - ‘
since Yli=o r« (0  =  1 f°r *■ Also, the mode o f  0o {T ), M[0o(T)\, say, is given by
M [»„(T )] = - ( ì - t ) È f r o ( r - » )
So if we let M0 =  (1 -  Jb) 0 *:‘ ro (7’ “  0>then M> can be interpreted as a discounted version 
o f the true proportion o f times we would have won contracts, if we had used this markup m 
at all time periods, recalling that 0o (T ) =  0o (T , m ). Now we can write
Tlim p(m,T) = + (1 -  l ) M 0
where
1 -  k)(n  +  1 )
e  [0 , 1 )
l + ( l - * ) ( » + l )
thus p (m ,T ) tends to a weighted average o f the discounted true proportion and a state o f 
complete uncertainly, represented by our probability o f  winning being l / ( n  +  1 ).
We also note, from (4.2.4), that
( T i l  -  [ l - t + M „ | [ l  +  p ( l - t ) - M o l
1M  )l [ ,  +  (n  +  1)(1  _  i ) ] a [ !  +  ( „  +  2)(1 -  *)|
So, unlike the static case, var{90(T)\ /♦  0 as T  —* oo. Hence we can make no statements about 
the convergence o f the random variable 0O■ We have thus avoided the somewhat unrealistic 
consequence o f the static Dirichlet model o f becoming completely certain about our chances 
o f winning with a markup m  as the number o f past contracts T  —» oo.
An alternative form o f the steady model is to apply the evolution in (4.2.1) to a trans­
formation o f 9(t). In particular we might think o f the multivariate logistic transform given
’’•(0=iog(£{o) i=1..... n
(this is used more extensively in the Dynamic Generalised Linear Model o f  sections 4.4 and 
4.5). Applying this steady evolution to if(t) gives
(#(t +  l ) | r ( 0 ) ~ P ( * « ( 0 )
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and
(»(‘ + 0  I r(l + 1 ) ) ~  r ( t « ( l)  + r ( l +  1))
the analogues o f (4.1.7) and (4.1.8) are,
| _  f  [*«o +  1 ]/ [1  +  * E ." = o Q<]p (m  |m ) =  | (
and
[*a0]/ [l  +  ’=0 a,]
[*a0 + 1] /  [1 + *(a0 + a 
[fca0]/[l + fc(a0 + a,)]
i < m" 
i > m*
. .v /  l k Q
n  >r. ) =  |
» <  m 
i >  m*
p^(m | m ',
Once again looking at the asymptotic behaviour, we have after T  contracts
a , p ,) =  * ’ - « . ( 0) +  f > ' r . ( r - l )
therefore as T  —► oo
and thus
(1 2 4)
p (m ,r )  - = Mo( 1 - * ) - *
So in this case p (t ,m )  tends to the discounted true proportion. Once again, o f course, 
war[ff0(7’ )] /*  0 as T  —► oo so we can make no comments about the convergence o f the random 
variable 0o . This alternative evolution illustrates nicely the flexibility o f  the steady model in 
allowing us to apply steady evolutions to transformations o f  random variables. The trans­
formation o f $ to t] is particularly appropriate as many have argued that it is easier and 
more natural to work in terms o f  these log odds rather than probabilities, see for example 
Spiegelhalter 8  Knill-Jones (1986).
In the above two cases we have assumed that the drift in information, modelled by the 
parameter k, is the same between contracts. Although this may be a reasonable assumption to 
make if contracts appear at regular, or approximately regular, intervals o f  time, it is probably 
more realistic to  relate k to the waiting time between contracts, with more drift o f information 
occuring over longer time periods. The simplest way to do  this is to let
1 -  4 =  (1 -  A )— (4 2.5)
To
Where r is the time interval between the tendering o f  the last contract and the tendering of 
this one, and r0 is some base time period, for example, the average time between contracts. 
Thus k  is now a function of r, and A is a constant we have to  set. Note that under this scheme, 
if  two contracts are put out simultaneously (r =  0) no discounting o f information takes place.
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Finally, consider setting the parameter A. From (4.2.5) we have that A is the value o f k 
representing the amount o f  drift in 0 that occurs in time r0. In the next section we explain 
how the parameter d =  y^"_ , a , - n  can be viewed as the number o f data points we think 
our current setting o f a  is worth. If after time r0 we have observed no data, (4.2.1) tells us 
that d will be updated to Ad. So we can set A by answering the question ‘ after a further time 
period r0 , what proportion o f  its present value will our current setting o f a  be worth ? ’ . This 
proportion will be A, and will usually be in the range (.8 ,1).
4.3 Using T h e M odel In  Practice.
To use the model described in the previous tw o sections we must first set the prior parameters 
Q o (m ),.. .  , a n (m ). At first sight it seems we must specify n +  1 functions o f m, for example 
by putting a joint distribution across X t , . . .  , X n and setting (m ) from  the relationship 
Oj(m) =  a 0 (m ) ( l  -  fa [m ))/ fa (m ), a0 (m ) being arbitarily specified. However we can avoid 
this by conditioning on the event we do not win, as follows. Let fa denote the probability that 
company i  wins the contract given that we do not. Then it is easily shown that
A  plausible modelling assumption is that the distribution o f <fa , . . .  , <f>n should not depend on 
our chosen markup m. From De Groot (1970) we have,
(<t> l .  ••• ,<t>n) ~  ,a n)
with c * i , . . .  , q „  as in (4 .1.1). So we conclude that the parameters ,a „  will not need to
depend on m  either. We also have
E[& ] =  fa
If we let P  =  j then a< =  0 fa . So for a fixed ¡3 we can determine values for , by 
estimating j>,. Clearly represents the proportion o f contracts we would expect company i  to 
win when we do not win. If we are completely uninformed about our competitors we could set 
4>x =  l / n  for all In most cases though, we will presumably have some information about the 
past success rates o f our competitors. This information could be used to fix our estimate o f fa
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as the proportion o f contracts F, would have won if F0 were not in contention. The parameter
0  reflects our confidence in our prior settings o f f a , . . .  , f a . Larger values o f 0  correspond 
to greater confidence. To calibrate 0 , consider the case 0  =  n and fa =  1 /n , so a* =  1 for
1 =  ,n . This represents a state o f complete ignorance about the fa ’s, since the Dirichlet
distribution degenerates to a uniform distribution. As 0  increases the a , ’s increase and we 
move away from  the uniform. This suggests setting 0  — n =  d say, d  >  0, where larger values 
of d correspond to more confidence about our prior setting of the ^, ’s. In fact we can be more 
precise and set d by letting it represent the number o f data points we think our prior beliefs 
are worth.
Consider now the remaining problem o f assigning a prior value to  a 0(m ). We could simply 
use
However, direct assesment o f  P i(m ) is often difficult, and even if we put a prior distribu­
tion on X i , . . .  ,X n computation o f  V», (m ) is tedious. Since our prior value for p(m ) is 
Oo(m)/[0 +  a „(m )] , we can write a 0(m ) =  0p(m )/[ 1 — p(m)]. So why not assign prior beliefs 
directly to p (m ) ? A  simple form  would be
Here, we are certain to win with a markup o f L or less, and certain to lose with a markup 
o f U or more. In between, the probability o f  us winning with a markup m behaves as 1/m . 
O f course if we have any information on our competitors it should be used to produce a more 
appropriate form for p(m ).
At first glance it may appear we have com e full circle, since we are now proposing to fix 
prior parameters by producing an estimate o f  p (m ). However, provided we have not chosen 
d too large, after observing the first few data points our estimates o f  the probabilities will 
be insensitive to these initial settings. This is especially true with the steady models, which 
automatically discount prior information. W hat is important is to have a simple method for 
assigning prior parameters that allows us to  incorporate intuitive beliefs, rather than requiring 
precise mathematical specifications.
(4.3.1)
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Summarising, we have shown that it is only neccesary to  specify prior information once, at 
the beginning. FYom then on our parameters are updated directly. It is required that prior 
values are given for the parameters 4>l , . . .  ,4>n ,d  and p (m ), all o f these can be given practical 
interpretations and so are easy to set. Uninformative prior settings for these parameters 
have also been given, for use when no strong information is available about the behaviour of 
com peting firms. O f course just because our model updates parameters automatically once 
they have been set apriori, this does not mean that we cannot intervene to adjust them in 
the light o f  relevant external information. This information could be, for example, that we 
discover one o f  our competitors is in desperate need o f work. We discuss this further later in 
the section.
We conclude our discussion o f prior parameters by looking at one implication o f the Dirichlet 
assumption (4.1.1). Suppose we have opted to  have a prior directly on X x, . . .  ,X n and thus 
maintain seperate values for , . . .  , o^,. If at some stage we gain information about company 
F} , then our estimate o f  ^ .(m ) (i  /  j )  will be unchanged, since =  a o / ( o o  + a< ). Suppose we 
believe that if  com pany Fi has a reasonable chance o f winning then so will company F . In the 
event o f  company F{ winning we would thus want both V>, and if>j to be decreased. In the current 
setup, only would be decreased. One simple way o f  overcoming this discrepancy is to group 
together these similar companies, and put a Dirichlet model over the groups. For example 
if we have five competitors Fl t . . .  ,F S we may group them as follows { F i , F2) ,  {F 3t F4, F6}. 
Thus (4.1.1) becomes (^o.^i.^a) ~  P ( a o ,a i ,a 3). Where 9X =  p[F x or F3 wins) and 03 =  
p(F3 or F4 or F5 wins). We then interpret tpx(m ) as,
V>i(m) =  p (F 0 beats Fx and F3 | only F0 ,F x or F3 can win)
•/'a(ro) is interpreted similarly. Our prior settings for Oo, c*i and a 3 can be determined as 
before.
Another reason why we may wish to group companies together, is that the person putting 
the contract out to  tender will often have grouped the companies in his own mind. Given he 
has done this, there are then practical and theoretical reasons to suggest that he should, as far 
as possible, ask just one company from each group to tender. Assuming our groupings will be 
similar to  his, we can take advantage o f  this by grouping companies ourselves, and thus have 
far more efficient updating.
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Consider now the problem o f  computing our optimal markup at each time period. A  natural 
way of doing this is to maximise our expected percentage profit over m for the next contract. 
This profit function is always o f  the form
p ro f{m -,r ,N ) =  (m  -  1)
fc* Q0(m ) +  Ci(r,JV) 
k " a o (m )  +  c,(Ar)
m €  ( m ; ,m ;+1)
where cx (r, TV) and c2(r) depend on the form  o f the steady model we are using, and the order in 
which the markups m \, . . .  , m „  have been recorded. For example under the steady evolution 
applied directly to the Dirichlet distribution we have
N
c ,(r .J V ) =  1 -  * "  + ^ t ' r „ ( J V  - 1)
« = 0
C,(JV) =  + (AT + 1)(1 -  * " )  + £  *'
p ro f  is a piecewise function o f  m so we need to  maximise it over each piecewise segment, 
i.e. for each r. Clearly for each interval (m ;,m * +1), the maximum o f  p ro f(m \ r ,N )  will, more 
often than not, occur at one o f  the endpoints. The following result takes advantage o f this to 
simplify our maximisation problem .
Lemma 4.3.2.
Assume that for m > 1,
( 1 ) p (m ) is apriori continuous and decreasing
(2) there exists rt such that ^ p r o f ( m ; r l t N ) > 0  for all m €  [ l ,m * l + 1]
Then the maximum o f  p ro/ (m ; r, N ) in is achieved at m ‘ +1 for all r <  r,
PROOF:
Assumption (2) tells us that p r o f (m ;r l t N ) >  0  for all r < ri with m €  (**»,>m r+i)> since 
if  r <  ri the range (m ;,m ;+1) is in the range [ l ,m ;i + 1|. This is equivalent to
ft(fi; AT,m) = (m l)(c,(Ar) -  c,(r, yv)) +  (a„ + c,(r, JV) )(a„ + ' , ( * ) )  >  0
clearly h(r; N , m) is a decreasing function o f r, since a 0 >  0, ^  <  0 from  assumption ( 1 ), and 
Ci(r, N ) is an increasing function o f  r. Therefore h (r ;N ,m ) > h (rx; N , m ) > 0  Vr <  rx and 
Vm €  (tn ;,m ;+1), hence p r o f (m ;r ,N )  is an increasing function in (m ’ ,m ‘ + l ) for all r <  rx. 
So the maximum o f p r o f  (m\r, N )  in (rn‘ ,m ’  + l ) is achieved at m ; +1 for all r <  r x. □
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In practice the lemma suggests the following procedure. Maximise the profit function 
by solving ^ ~ p ro f =  0, for r =  N ,N  -  1 , . . .  until we find a value o f r, rlt for which 
j^ p ro f(m \ r ,N )  > 0 for all m €  [l,m *+ I]. From then on consider only the the profit function 
at the upper endpoints.
Before giving an example we discuss how some o f  the practical considerations outlined in 
§1.1 can be incorporated into the model.
(i) More realistic utilities and Non-price considerations. In the computation of the optimal 
markup above the criteria used was simply to  maximise the expected profit. In practice 
other ‘non-price’ considerations may need to be looked at. Properties o f  a particular contract 
may make us want to change our bidding behaviour, for example we may want to bid more 
competitively for contracts we deem to be o f a high prestige, or for contracts with a very high 
cost. These effects are best handled as regressors in the model o f  §4.4 and §4.5. However, 
considerations such as the amount o f work we are currently engaged on can be handled by 
altering our utility to reflect the fact that we may want to bid less competitively when we are 
already engaged on a number o f other jobs. For exam ple we might take a utility o f the form
U (m ) =  u (m ,J )p r ° f {m ,r,N )
where J is the number o f  jobs we are currently engaged on and u (m ,J ) ,  which lies in (0,1] 
say, satisfies the following
(1) u(m , J ) is an increasing function of m
(2) u(m , J ) is a decreasing function o f J
(3) - is a decreasing function o f J
A utility o f this form will make us use larger markups as J increases.
This idea can be extended to a stochastic control model if we consider how the event o f 
us winning the present contract affects our bidding on future contracts. Our task now is 
to maximise our expected utility up to some finite time horizon. Note that this requires 
specification o f a distribution on the duration o f a jo b .
(ii) Seasonality. Like regressors such as prestige and the cost o f  the contract, seasonality 
can be handled in a sophisticated manner by using the models o f  §4.4 and §4.5. However, 
unlike these regressors, it is simple to build a seasonal effect in to  the model as it stands.
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One o f  the reasons for this is the systematic nature o f the seasonality we expect to see in a 
bidding environment. This systematic behaviour is likely to be so because a firms bidding 
practices w ill clearly be influenced by first harmonic effects such as number o f  daylight hours, 
and temperature.
The m ethod for modelling this first harmonic effect is based on the idea that a given markup 
in one m onth is equivalent, in terms o f  our probability o f  winning, to a different markup in 
another m onth. We can model this by having a separate probability vector, #*(m ), for each 
month t, but relating them via the equation
where a and b are fixed parameters. The main disadvantage o f this m odel compared with 
the m odel o f  §4.5 is that it does not provide any formal framework for on  line estimation o f  
parameters.
(in)Intervention. It should be stressed that the output from a simplistic m odel, such as that 
described in the previous two sections, should only be used as a guide for making decisions, 
and intervention by the operator should be encouraged whenever subjective information is 
received. In practice subjective information can easily be incorporated by altering the current 
settings o f  a 0 , - - - , a n. For example we can easily reflect a general change in the whole bidding 
environment by  decreasing P, to reduce our confidence in the current a  values, and resetting
, • • • , a „ , to  leave a*/fi unchanged. A  more detailed account o f situations where intervention 
may be called for, and the form  this intervention should take is given in §4.5.
This exam ple is based on real data issued by Stratford on Avon district council. The 
contracts were for external painting o f  buildings during the calendar year 1987. We can assume 
each contract is bid for by four companies, excluding ourselves.
The analysis will proceed along the following lines,
( 1 ) set prior parameters,
( 2) estim ate the cost o f the forthcoming contract, c,
(3) com pute the optimal markup, m,
(4) observe the winning markup, and return to step (2).
Exam ple.
For step (1) we shall use the uninformative priors mentioned in the previous section. So take 
4>\ =  1/4 for « =  1 , . . .  ,4 ,d  =  0 and p(m ) as in (4.3.1) with L =  1.1 and U =  1.3, say. Since 
all the contracts occur in such a short space o f time it is uneccessary to discount information, 
so we shall use the static model o f  §4.1.
Table 4.3.3 summarises the observed markups and our chosen markups for each o f 31 con­
tracts.
Figure 4.3.4 shows the probability we win with markup m both apriori and after the 31 
contracts. The corresponding expected percentage profit functions are shown in figure 4.3.5.
We see that, at least initially, strict adherence to the model would result in us winning a 
lot o f contracts. This suggests that a utility that discourages us from having too many jobs 
on the go at once may be appropriate. Note that on the 31*’ contract =  26 illustrating the 
computational saving o f using lem m a 4.3.2 when the number o f observed markups gets large.
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N cost
( i>
chosen
markup
winning
markup
m"
0 18,000 1.140 1.126 1.126
1 11,000 1.126 1.126 1.192
2 11,500 1.126 1.126 1.191
3 6,000 1.126 1.126 1.244
4 7,500 1.191 1.191 1.210
5 9,250 1.191 1.191 1.193
6 8,000 1.191 1.191 1.229
7 12,000 1.191 1.191 1.199
8 11,750 1.191 1.191 1.223
9 15,500 1.191 1.149 1.149
10 10,000 1.191 1.162 1.162
11 8,000 1.191 1.191 1.207
12 14,750 1.191 1.143 1.143
13 14,000 1.143 1.135 1.135
14 12,000 1.126 1.126 1.170
15 11,750 1.126 1.126 1.188
16 13,500 1.135 1.135 1.156
17 11,000 1.135 1.135 1.180
18 10,250 1.135 1.135 1.204
19 9,000 1.135 1.135 1.185
20 9,500 1.143 1.143 1.195
21 7,500 1.143 1.143 1.249
22 11,250 1.143 1.143 1.190
23 9,500 1.143 1.143 1.219
24 8,750 1.143 1.143 1.237
25 10,750 1.143 1.143 1.183
26 10,000 1.143 1.143 1.215
27 9,750 1.180 1.177 1.177
28 14,500 1.156 1.130 1.130
29 13,750 1.156 1.156 1.183
30 12,000 1.170 1.170 1.174
31 9,000 1.174
TABLE 4.3.3
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4.4  T h e  D ir ic h le t -M u lt in o m ia l D G L M .
In chapter 2 the DGLM  o f  West et. al. (1985) was reviewed, and the special case o f the 
Beta-Binomial model was described in detail. In this section we concentrate on developing 
a multivariate analogue to the Beta-Binom ial model, namely a Dirichlet-Multinomial model. 
Details o f applying this to our sequential Gates type model are then discussed in the next 
section.
The basic setup is as follows. A t time t let n +  1 events have probabilities /¿o (0> • • • >Mn(0> 
E " = o * ( 0  =  1 - And let »-¿(t) be the number o f  occurrences o f event i  in m, trials, so our 
likelihood is given by
subject to the constraint E "= o  r»(0  =  m‘ -
Our prior for ¡i(t) is the Dirichlet distribution with parameters a 0(i)> • • - >a n(0> *-e -
where a ,  =  E "=  o Q> •
Before continuing it is worth pointing out one o f  the major problems that arises when at­
tempting to define any DGLM . In the models o f West et. al.(1985) with a univariate parameter 
it is implicitly assumed that the ‘natural’ parameter, r/, is unconstrained (from the fact that x\ 
is simply read o ff from the exponential family density). This is in fact a neccessary condition, 
since r; satisfies g(ij) =  F T0, and when 0 undergoes the state transformation 0 —» V  — GO +  w, 
r) transforms to  f)' say, where $(»?') =  F TO' . If r\ is constrained to lie in some set S, bearing 
in mind that 0  is unconstrained, it is in general not at all clear that t]' will also lie in 5 , as 
it is required to  do. When the underlying parameter is multivariate, as in our case, exactly 
the same problem exists, but it is now far more likely that this parameter will be constrained. 
Indeed in our case the parameter ft is subject to  E<*=o^* =  * an<* e  [0.1) f ° r »• One 
obvious way to  overcome this technical difficulty is to require that the transformation from /* 
to the ‘natural’ parameter q is such that q  can take any value in Rn , i.e. ij is unconstrained. 
We now construct such a transformation for ft in the Dirichlet-Multinomial problem above.
r (t ) ~  M ultinom ial ( m t,fi(t ) )
that is
(4.4.2)
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Firstly we remove the constraint Y17=o =  1 by dividing through by /io- That is, the
n +  1 parameters p o ,■.• , p „ are transformed to the n  independent paramaters A j, . . .  , A„ 
where A< =  p j /p 0 . The only constraint on A is that A* >  0 for « =  1 , . . .  ,n , since given any 
A j, ■. • , A„ satisfying this condition, the implied /i is
1 A.
^  = TTT. "• = IT T . 1 = 1......."
where A, =  x A ,. Thus the conditions on /i are satisfied automatically. We see in the next 
section that this reparameterisation has a natural interpretation in relation to the sequential 
Gates type model.
It is now clear that our natural parameter tf can be defined by the transformation
where hi is any invertible function from (0 ,oo ) to R.
An obvious candidate for such a transform is h ,(x ) =  lo g z  for i  =  1 , . . .  , n, since then
which is the well known multivariate logistic transform. This has been used in many appli­
cations and there is evidence that some people find it easier to think in terms o f  these log 
odds than actual probabilities, see Spiegelhalter 8  Knill-Jones (1986). A  similar problem of
ing a constrained unknown density, using a logistic density transform, in a density estimation 
problem.
The distributions o f  A and »/ are as follows.
The distribution o f A is the standard Inverted Dirichlet distribution. By analogy to the univari­
ate Logistic-Beta distribution we shall refer to (4.4.3) as the Logistic-Dirichlet distribution, 
i.e. if|a ~  L D i(a ).
tji =  hi(Xi) i = l , . . .  , n
i =  1 , . . .  , n
transforming out constraints is considered in Leonard (1978), where he considers transform­
p(A ,,... ,A „ | a 0, . . .  , a „ )  =
P i n !»••• ,n n ,On) =
F (a . ) ezp (X T =i >?.<».) (4.4.3)
n .n=o r (“ * ) l1 +  E ,"=i «7>(»h)]a*
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Directly from (4.4.3), the moment generating function of t) is given by
from which we have
nr.,r(o,)
E»7, =  ’l (a i ) -  7(<*o)
V ar tji =  i f a )  +  7 (a 0) (4.4.4)
C ov (n, ,V j) =  i(<*0) for a l l j  i  /  j
where 7  is the digam m a function defined in chapter 2 .
Note that, from the guide relation (4.4.7), these equations impose distributional constraints 
on the state 0. We shall return to the signifigance o f this, and the form o f these constraints 
later in the section.
Returning to (4.4 .3), we can simply compute the mode o f  r)it rj, , as
and the curvature o f  p(i| | a )  at the mode in the 17, direction as
Q d n ) =
~ a , ) 
a .
N.B.
(4.4.5)
(4.4.6)
[ From now on it is desirable, for clarity, to distinguish between vectors and matrices. Thus, 
for the rest o f this section, I shall adopt the following notation. Column vectors will be 
denoted by bold characters e.g. a. Matrices will be denoted by underlined bold characters e.g. 
fc. A  matrix fe will be assumed to be made up o f  column vectors denoted by b<, that is b  =  
( b j , . . .  ,b „ ) .  If it is neccessary to index a matrix this will be done with a superscript e.g. b* =
( K ,  .b i ) ,  i
As in the univariate model we now assume the guide relationship
f ( 0  =  F T (t)f(t) (4.4.7)
where $[t) is the state matrix at time t, and F (t) is a vector o f regressors at time t. Note that 
(4.4.7) is wholly equivalent to the n univariate guide relationships
*fc(0  =  F T (t)# ,(t) i = I ,
# ,(t) being the state vector for
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By analogy with the univariate DGLM our priors are
^ (i -  1) | Z>,_ t -  L D i(a (t  -  1))
~ [M(<-l),C(t- 1)] (4.4.8)
where M(< -  1) =  E [f(t  -  I )| D ,_ !]  and Q (t  -  1 ) =  V ar [f( l  -  1) | Z?*_»]. Strictly speaking 
C i s a n n x n x n x n  matrix, however, for clarity we shall write it as an n2 x n2 partitioned 
m atrix as follows
C  =  [ C J  (4.4.9)
where =  C ov (0 ,,0 } ).
Precisely as in the univariate case we m odel a dynamic development on the state 0 by 
changing its mean and variance to
1(01 A - . ~ [a(0,B(01
where
a (0  =  -  i)
WO = »«(<>] , B,,(0 = Bo (0£(0C .,(‘ - i ) S r (0 a ,(0  {-».4.10)
and (0  is a diagonal matrix o f discount factors for C tJ.
If w e now assume ti(t)\D t~ i ~  L D i(a ' ( t ) ) ,  the guide relationship (4.4.7) can be used to 
deduce values for c*J,(t),. . . ,a j ,( t ) .  A  direct extension o f the arguments in the univariate case 
suggest we should obtain these values by solving
® l a ( 0 I A - . ]  =  f ( i )  =  F r (0 a (0  
V'«r[,(i)|D,-1] = a (0  =  |rr (0Bii («)»(«) I
Before continuing we return to  the constraint on 0 imposed by the distributional constraints 
on 11- T h is manifests itself above in that we only have n +  1 parameters a0 , ■ • • , a n with which 
to reconcile the cumulants o f  1} and f_. We clearly have to let the mean o f £ be unconstrained 
so we are forced to drastically constrain the variance o f |, Q , or equivalently, only carry a 
m inimal amount o f information about its variance. The first obvious constraint on C  is as 
follows
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imposed by the fact that Cov(tji t rij) is the same for all i , j  i  /  j .  Rather than try to specify 
the other constraints on  £  in this way our approach will be to  isolate w hat function o f £  we 
can specify unconstrained, and then use the constraints to  solve for C ,, and £ '  as functions o f 
this setting. It transpires that such a function is
s* = £ & .
We consider the form  o f  £ ^  and £ '  as functions o f £ *  and M  in a m oment. Given this we 
can restate our prior on  9 as follows
*(‘ - l ) ! R - .  ~  [M ( < -1 ) ,E * ( < -1 ) 1
and if we assume the dynam ic development takes C*(t -  1) to R ‘  (i), (4.4 .10) becomes
B*(0 = B*(0G(0C*(t-i)GT(t)B*(t)
where B '( t )  is a diagonal matrix of discount factors for £*(<)•
Returning to the problem  o f  computing values for a '(t) , we can now sim ply solve
E[f (0 IA -» ]  =  f(0
iz  I A -.|  =  ¿ « . . ( 0  = TT (OB* (0F(1)
l= 1 1=1
If, as in West et. al. (1985), we opt for computational simplicity by replacing E[if(t) | D ,_ x] 
by mode [i|(t) | Dt-  j] , and Var[»jj(t) | Z>t — x] by the inverse o f the curvature o f  \ D , - 1 ) at
the mode in the tfc d irection, we get, from (4.4.5) and (4.4.6), 
i + y '
“ ° ( ) e ; , ,»,,(<) ¿ j i
o {(* )  =  o^ i*)«7’ "*  (4.4.11)
A  pleasing property o f  this updating is as follows. If G (t) is the identity m atrix, (i.e. we are 
assuming no growth trend), and the regressors and seasonal effects on two succesive contracts 
are the same, then a very acceptable way to  model a dynamic development directly on i|(t) 
would be to use the Simple Power Steady model. As discussed in §4.2 this would result in the 
updating
a '( t )  =  k ,a (t  -  1 )
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where k, €  (0,1] is the discount factor. It is easy to show that the updating in (4.4.11) is 
equivalent to this updating with
t  _  S ' . .  V a r  K ( ‘ ~ i ) I A - i )
ET.,V«(*<0l A -,)
_  F T ( l ) S - ( i -  l)F(l)
F r (l)B -(<)C‘ (l-l)B -(< )F (< )
So the simple power steady model evolution is a just special case o f  the evolution specified in 
(4.4.11).
In the example in the next section it is found that approximating the variance by the inverse 
of the curvature can cause problems, especially if t 1' , . . .  , t1'  are large. We can overcome this 
problem by solving the following equation directly for a'0.
/ ( “ o) =  'VW)) +  ¿ 7 ( e A <*o) “  ¿ 9 «  =  0
The other a ' values are then as in (4.4.11). A  direct search method on / ( . )  can easily be 
constructed by noting that / ( . )  is a decreasing function (such a method is described in the 
next section). The above comments about the steady model being a special case still apply, 
however k, will now be given by
t ,  =  ^ l i l
M O
We now return to the problem o f specifying C^, and C ' as functions o f £ * ,  M and the vector 
E  which specifies the guide relation. The guide relation (4.4.7) immediately gives us 
V ar rji
£ . .  =
a  --
E r . i V o r i ) ,
C <~( 1 . . 1 , )
c
E “ , | V « r i ) , a
O f course given M , Ç* and F  we can determine values for a0t - ■ ■ ,ctn , from (4.4.11), and hence 
values for the cumulants o f tj in the above. If we once again replace the mean by the mode 
and the variance by the inverse o f the curvature the above become
( e ; . , j c  < " )
H- - ) c' s iàr£v 2» e ; „  • - ' * [ ! - « ' *
where f, = (FTM)i , h = e- / , [l -  eA + e/' ] " 1 and the approximation 7 (a^) + 7 (00) =
a ,/ o i(a , -  a .)  gives 7 (00) =  (n  +  l ) / 2n a 0 when =  ao for i  =  1 , . . .  ,n.
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Given the observations r0(t) , . . .  , r„ (t ) ,  the conjugacy o f the m ultinom ial and Dirichlet dis­
tributions gives the updating
•»(01 A ~ LDi(ao(t),. ,a.(0)
a.(0 = a;(0 + r.(t)
In order to update our beliefs about 0(t)\Dt , i.e. obtain M (t ) and  C '( t ) ,  we first assume 
that C (t)  is unconstrained and proceed as in West et. al. (1985). T h is  leads to the updating 
in (4.4.14), which would be applicable if C  were unconstrained. H owever when the constrained 
values are substituted in, (4.4.14) reduces to the very pleasing updating in (4.4.15).
First note the identities
M(!)=E,E[*(i)Ih(i),B,]
& ,(< )  =  E „ [C o » (# , ( l ) ,# , (< )N (< ) .A ) ]+  (4.4.13)
Cou,(E[i.(0 I »(0,0.!. *[»>(*) \ •>(<), A ])
Precisely as in the univariate case ij(t) is sufficent for #(t) i.e.
p(i(<)h(O.0.)=i>(«i)l*(O,*>.-.)
Thus if we now construct an estimator o f E[tf(t) | i|(t), Dt- 1 ] we can  feed it in to (4.4.13) in 
place o f E [f(t )  | i|(t),D ,] to produce our updated cumulants for 0(t) \ D t . Take this estimator 
to be o f the form
E [«< ) I i ( i ) ,  o , . ,] =  d ° (0  +  ¿ d ’ (0 i .( 0  =  d ( 0
where d  , . . .  , d n are chosen to minimise
¿ T r a « E , E [ ( # .  -  d ,)(# , -  d . ) r  | i[ ( l) .D ,_ ,]
If this minimum is achieved at d  it is natural to take
=  E „E [ (« ,( ! )  -  d , ) ( « , ( ! )  -  d , ) T l l ( l ) ,D , . , l
Performing this minimisation yields
d  =  ( » - +
=  » + 5 I ( l »  - / » l i ' a " 1
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where ,* ( l )  =  Cov  (i(i),h fc(t) I A - i )  =  (• »< ), . .»S(<) ).  ■*(<) =  “ «  (# ,(< ),1 .(1 ) I A - , )  =  
R*y(t)F(t). And hence
+ Ê Ê ! « ( * * S “')'(«,3 ‘ ) î
Substituting these in to (4.4.13) yields
M(i) = a + X](s* -  /* )s‘ g '
(4.4.14)
+  ¿ ¿ ( p * i + 4 w ) ( i * 9  ‘ )* (» '9  ‘ )J
where all the quantities on the right are functions o f t, and <?*(<) =  E[f7*(t) | Dt\ and Pki(t) —
C ov{rik (t),ri1(t)\D t ).
Equation (4.4.14) would be our final updating if C  were unconstrained. However we can 
simplify these updating equations using the structure we have on > that is
where, if we use the previous approximations, =  e ~ 1' [ l - e /l ef , ] ~ l , c  =  ( n + l ) / 2 n and
fi  =  (FTa),. Note that the above equations hold when we are not using these approximations, 
the only difference being that the forms o f b, and c will be different.
This immediately gives
where diag denotes a diagonal matrix and e  is the n x 1 vector o f ones. A  little manipulation 
o f these yields
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(s*S"‘)'
whence the updating (4.4.14) becomes
I
0 * 7£ *
i = k
M,(t) =  «, + (g, ~ /,)&‘F F TR*F
£ * (« )  =  B* -
(B ‘ F )(B ‘ F )r
FtB*F F TB *F  J
(4.4.15)
where once again all the quantities on the right are functions o f  t. These equations are very 
appealing as they are directly analogous to the Beta-Binomial updating equations given in 
chapter 2 .
The full system of updating parameters is shown in figure (4.4.16).
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FIGU RE 4 4.16
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4.5 A  D G L M  For T h e Sequential G ates T yp e  M odel.
Harrison (1988) stresses the principle o f  ‘management by exception’ in relation to forecasting 
models such as the D G LM  o f the last section. By this he means that the output from the model 
should be combined with any exceptional subjective information the operator may have at a 
given time period. That is, the operator should feel free to intervene in the free running of 
the model. The problem  we consider now is how to simply incorporate subjective information 
by adjusting the parameters in the model. Note that we might intervene for two possible 
reasons. The first arises if the operator learns o f some change in the environment which 
requires permanent readjustment o f the model. In this case once the parameters have been 
altered the model will be left to run starting from these new values. The second arises if the 
operator knows that some unusual circumstances pertain only at a given time period. Here 
the parameters will be adjusted in the same way for decision making at the given time period. 
However the parameters will not then be updated and the model will run on with its old 
parameter values.
In the DGLM o f §4.4 the obvious place to  intervene is when the parameters a ( , , . . .  , a'„ are 
specified. The form o f this intervention is based on the following two familiar facts
( 1 ) =  P(Fi wins the forthcoming contract | we use markup m)
(2) a', (m ) is a measure o f our confidence in the models parameter values
We now consider some general situations where intervention may be called for, and the form 
this intervention should take.
(i) N on-specific changes in whole bidding environment.
These can arise due to  changes in raw material prices or supplies say, which could, unknown 
to  us, be beneficial or detrimental to a given competitor depending on their current circum­
stances. This sort o f change is usually only significant in that it makes us less sure how our 
competitors are likely to  behave, that is we have less confidence in our current parameter set­
tings. We can simply incorporate this by reducing the value o f a't (m ) and reseting ct(-(m) to 
leave a'i (m)/a't (m ) unchanged. This reduced value o f a't (m ) makes the model more sensitive 
to  the new data, and thus allows it to  rapidly readjust itself to  the new environment.
(ii) Individual com pany becomes m ore/less com petitive.
This can arise if we learn one o f our com petitors is in financial difficulty, in which case desper­
ation for work is likely to  make them more competitive. Or alternatively they have plenty of
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work in which case they are likely to be less competitive. The way to approach this is simply 
to increase (Fi more com petitive) or decrease (F, less competitive) the parameter a '(m ). This 
will o f course alter so, depending on our confidence in our information about F, , we
may wish to readjust a ',(m ) as (i).
(ill) Specific changes in w hole bidding environment.
If we learn something specific about our com petitors, for example they are all likely to start 
using smaller/larger markups, then it clearly could be costly to simply wait for the model 
to readjust as in (i). We can handle this immediately by noting that if all our competitors 
start using smaller/larger markups this is equivalent to our company becoming less/more 
competitive. So we can simply readjust our parameter a£,(m) as in (ii).
(iv) ‘ O n e-o ff’ contracts.
All the above have been examples o f permanent readjustments to the running o f the model. 
A  case where we might only want to adjust our parameters temporarily is as follows. We 
learn that one o f our com petitors F, is either in no position to com pete for, or has no chance 
o f  winning, a given contract. Possibly due to  non-price considerations. This will only be 
beneficial if all our com petitors are privy to  this information, whence we set a '(m ) =  0 in 
the calculation o f  our markup for this particular contract. Our own optimal markup will 
consequently be larger.
We now consider the model specifications, that is the definition o f  states, and the prior 
settings.
Consider first the definition o f  our state matrix g(t, m ). Note that the i*h column o f 0 is the 
state vector for company i, thus for the definition o f the states and the prior settings we shall 
consider just one company and drop the subscript i. One then simply repeats the procedure for 
each company. Loosely speaking the states for a particular company fall in to three categories, 
namely
( 1 ) seasonal effects
(2) regressor effects
(3) growth effects
A  growth effect is not likely to  be relevant as markup policy is unlikely to drift in a systematic 
way. We are more likely to see discrete jumps due to changes in our competitors policy, these
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Consider now our prior settings M (0 ,m ) =  E [0(O ,m )] and C (0 ,m ) =  C ov (0 (0 ,m ). Note 
th at if we are working on the settings for company i 0 (t,m )  will be the ith column o f the 
state matrix $ (t,m )  and the expectation and covariance above correspond to M ,(0, m) and 
C ^ ,(0 ,m ). For simplicity we shall consider only uninformative prior settings. Obviously other 
prior  beliefs can be incorporated in the same manner.
Clearly for all effects other than 0o it is reasonable as an uninformative setting to take 
E [0i(O ,m )] =  k,, that is a constant effect for all m. However it is then clearly fallacious to take 
E [0 o (O,m)] =constant, since this would imply E[»7(0,m )] =constant which is clearly not so. In 
order to set E[0o(O, m )] we shall construct a plausible form for E[rj(0, m )] in the absence of all 
effects and take this as our expectation o f 0o (O ,m ). Recall the definition o f  is
Firstly restrict the values m can take to a realistic range, m €  (L ,U ) say. Thus, from the 
definition o f t] above, tj(0, m) is an increasing function o f m on (L ,U ). It will prove very 
convenient for the com putation o f our optimal markup (discussed later) if our prior expectation 
is a  step function o f  m . A  simple example is as follows. If we specify the values fa  — E[ry(0, L)] 
and  fju =  E [ij(0 ,17)], then given a refinement parameter u we could take
F or example when v  =  10, (L ,U ) =  (1 ,1 .5 ), flu =  2 and fjL =  - 2  this appears as in figure 
(4 .5 .4 ) on p.60.
This piecewise form  is nothing like as cumbersome as it seems since the moment we start 
receiving data all our means and variances will be defined as piecewise functions o f m. So we 
have to be prepared to  handle this form  anyway. To set fju and fjL we simple estimate how 
m an y times more/less likely than us the given company is to  win win a contract when we use 
a  markup near U/L. For example we might think that the company is ten times more likely 
th an  us to win the contract if we use a markup near U , whence p/po =  10 and rfu =  log 10.
p (t,m ) =  P (com petitor wins forthcoming contract |we use markup m ) 
p0(t ,m ) =  P (we win forthcoming contract with markup m )
E [-,(0,m )l =  E [« „ (0 ,m )] " f  [L  +  ^ ( i  +  | )] +1*1 , -  Lfju
U - L
(4.5.3)
v
=  0,. 1
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It seems very reasonable to assume all effects are apriori independent, thus C *(0 ,m ) will 
be a diagonal m atrix for all m. The procedure for setting ,k t and V  ar (0o (O ,m )),
. . .  ,V  ar (0((O, m )) are similar. For regressor effects proceed as follows. Consider a change 
in regressor from  r  t o r '  (around the ‘ average’ value o f the regressor) with other regressors 
unchanged, and estim ate the corresponding change in 17, »> —♦ rj1 say, and also the range of 
realistic possibles values o f »7',  t]' e  [17'  -  « 1 , r\’  +  e2] say. We can then take
r — r'
The form for the variance is based on the fact that we hope the distribution o f 0 will not be 
too far from being normal. And if it were exactly normal we could say that a realistic range for 
0 would be E[0] ±  3y/var 9, which can be rearranged to give var9 =  [realistic range o f  0 /6]2 .
For the seasonal effect we can proceed similarly to obtain the mean and variance o f  the 
amplitude o f the com bined sin and cos terms. It is however also necessary to set a phase by 
deciding how the effect should be distributed between the sin term and the cos term. It may 
for example not b e  unreasonable to  apriori take the mean o f  the cos term to be zero. This 
would be equivalent to saying that January is the month when com petition for contracts is 
toughest and July the month when com petition is weakest.
To set the variance o f 0o(O,m) we simply need to specify a range o f  values on »7(0, m ) for 
each piecewise segm ent and apply the above approximation, i.e. V  ar (0o (O ,m )) =  [range/6]2.
In order to ensure that we do not arrive at too  small a variance we must remember that the 
range we specify m ust contain almost every conceivable value ij' can take.
In the long term , when we have a reasonable amount o f data, these prior settings will have 
little effect on our decisions. So our main aim when setting prior parameters is simply to 
get values which are o f  the right magnitude and portray obvious apriori facts. The above 
procedures provide a  method for satisfying these aims.
Our final task is to  compute our optim al markup for a given contract. In the following 
example we will s im p ly  choose our markup to maximise our expected percentage profit function, 
p ro f(t,m ), on the next contract, where
p ro fit,m ) =  (m  -  l )p o (t ,m ) =
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Our step prior and the form o f the updating guarantees that p ro f  will always be a step function 
o f m. Thus the only markups we need consider are those at the the upper ends o f the prior 
ranges and each subsequent lowest markup m ade by our competitors. There is now no problem 
in computing prof at each o f these markups and choosing the markup which yields the highest 
profit.
All the comments in §4.3 concerning m ore realistic utilities, by for example taking in to 
account the amount o f work we are currently engaged on, also apply here. The above comments 
about the step function remaining over tim e w ill o f  course also remain true, so these more 
general utilities will not make computation o f  the optimal markup any more complex.
Before giving an example it is worth mentioning a couple o f the computational techniques 
used in the example. Consider first com putation o f  the digamma function (7 ) and the trigamma 
function (7 ). The procedures found to work w ell in the example are as follows. First note the 
following exact formulae (Abramowitz 8  Stegun (1964) pp 258-260):
Where 7  ~  -  .577216 is Eulers gamma.
For 1  > 2 compute 7 (in t(x )), 7 (int(x) +  £ ) ,  7 (in t(x ) +  l ) ,  using the above. A  value for 7 (1 ) 
can then be obtained by quadratic interpolation on these three points. For x  <  2 the above 
procedure is unsatisfactory, so note the follow ing series expansions
7  and 7  could be computed by taking a large number of terms in these series. However this 
is somewhat slow to do every time we want to  com pute values. A  quicker method is simply 
to compute 7 (1 ) and 7 (1 ) at say 20 points in the range (0, 2) using the series expansion and 
compute other values by piecewise linear interpolation.
n €  N
n  €  N
n e  N
n e  N
* ¿ 0, - 1 , . . .
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Finally consider solving numerically the equation
/ ( z )  =  qr(z) +  ' jh  i ( e , ‘ x ) - ± q i i = 0
It is clear that for z  >  0 / ( z )  is a decreasing function. So it is easy to use a method that 
searches directly on / ( z ) .  This is also very desirable since it avoids the added complexity o f 
computing 7 - 1 or 7 . The method used in the example is simply a  modified midpoint method. 
Given the starting value z 0, taken as the value given by (4.4.11), com pute / ( z 0). If / ( z 0) > 0 
take z(, =  1.5z0 otherwise take z(, =  j^ Z q- Let A  be given by
and let h =  f (A ) .  A  is the point where the straight line through ( z 0, / ( z 0) )  and (x!0,f (x '0) )  
crosses the z  axes.
Set z0 to  be x'0 if f(x '0)  < / ( z 0), otherwise leave it unchanged. Set x'0 to be A. Recompute 
A  and repeat the procedure until A is as near 0 as required. T h e required value o f a'0 is then 
the corresponding value o f A. This procedure will always converge, and in practice has rarely 
taken more than 2 or 3 iterations.
We are to  compete against three companies (n =  3) on a series o f  contracts. We shall model a 
seasonal effect and regress on the prestige o f the contract at tim e t, nt . There is overwhelming 
evidence, in this bidding environment, that January is the m onth when competition for con­
tracts is toughest. Consequently, to reduce on computation, we shall model the seasonal effect 
by taking just the sin component o f (4.5.1). Thus our model parameters are as follows
Apriori we shall assume our competitors are identical and thus consider prior settings for just 
one company, i.e. just one column o f 9.
Consider first 0^(0, m ) the effect o f the prestige. Assume for a  contract of prestige .2 we 
believe our chances o f winning, with a given markup, to be tw ice that o f  company », thus
Exam ple.
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»7. ( 0, m) =  log If we now learn that the prestige is in fact .8 we might feel that we are 
only l£  times more likely to win than Fi but certainly in the range .5 to 2.5 times as likely, 
suggesting m) =  log | but »j'(0 ,m ) G [log * , log 2]. These imply
E[0^(O, m)] =  .48 for all i  and m
V ar [0^(0, m)] =  .20 for all i  and m
Similarly for the seasonal effect we may feel that our chances of winning, w ith a given 
markup, in July to be twice that o f F, and that this would fall to 1* times if it was in fact 
January, but lying within the range .5 to  2.5 times as likely, suggesting
for all i and m 
for all « and m
E[#j (0, m)] =  .29 
V ar  [#i(0 ,m )] =  .09
For E[0j,(O, m )] we shall use the form suggested in (4.5.3) with i/ =  5, L — 1.1, U  =  1.25, 
=  -0 .5 , and fju =  +0.5. Giving
E[0*o (O,m)] =
To set the variance we shall use the bounds indicated by the dotted lines in figure 4.5.5, yielding
-0.4 m  G (1.1,1.13]
-0.2 m G (1.13,1.16]
0 m G (1.16,1.19]
0.2 m G (1.19,1.22]
0.4 m G (1.22,1.25]
0.16 m e  (1.1,1.13]
0.13 m e (1.13,1.16]
0.11 m e  (1.16,1.19]
0.13 m G (1.19,1.22]
0.16 m e  (1.22,1.25]
Var [#*(0, m)] =
Contracts will be arriving at fairly regular time intervals, so information will be discounted 
with time by using the constant discount matrix
( .95 0 0 \ " 10 .99 0
0 0 .99 )Note that the majority o f discounting o f information is done via the basic setting 0O> reflecting 
the fact that we believe that the prestige and seasonal effects are likely to be fairly stable over 
time.
If contracts arrive at non-regular time intervals it would be neccessary to make B ‘  a function 
o f time t. This could be done by relating B ‘  to t in a linear way such as used for kt in §4.2.
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Table 4.5.6 lists the details o f  each o f 60 contracts together with our chosen markup and the 
lowest markup from  our competitors.
Figure 4.5.7 shows E[0o (6O,m) ](=  E [»j(60 ,m )]) for company 1 together with the prior set­
ting E [r j(0 ,m )]. The probability that we win the contract at time 60 (that is 
a'0(60 ,m )/ a '.(60 ,m ) ) is shown in Figure 4.5.8. Figure 4.5.9 shows the corresponding ex­
pected percentage profit function (pro/ (60, m ) ) for the contract at time 60.
We see that initially the model tends to choose the same markup for several time periods. 
This is mainly due to the fact that in the early stages the model only has a small number 
of markups to  choose from, and in part due to the continuing influence o f  the step function 
prior. However after about 30 contracts the model is starting to behave less predictably, and 
we see in figure 4.5 .9  that at contract 60 the expected percentage profit function is starting to 
resemble a continuous curve.
We might conclude that with a vague step prior, such as that used in this example, the 
model should n ot be relied upon too  heavily until at least 30 data points have been observed.
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con tract prestige
(» .)
m onth
(• .) m ark u p
m-
1 0.5 1 1.190 1.179
2 0.5 1 1.190 1.163
3 0.8 2 1.190 1.141
4 0.5 3 1.190 1.188
5 0.2 4 1.188 1.204
6 0.2 5 1.188 1.196
7 0.8 5 1.188 1.153
8 0.5 6 1.188 1.162
9 0.5 7 1.179 1.189
10 0.3 8 1.179 1.185
11 0.9 8 1.179 1.139
12 0.7 9 1.179 1.145
13 0.5 10 1.179 1.194
14 0.5 11 1.179 1.176
15 0.5 11 1.176 1.149
16 0.2 12 1.176 1.183
17 0.1 2 1.176 1.209
18 0.7 2 1.179 1.155
19 0.9 3 1.176 1.144
20 0.5 4 1.130 1.181
21 0.6 4 1.139 1.166
22 0.5 5 1.139 1.190
23 0.5 6 1.139 1.154
24 0.4 7 1.139 1.165
25 0.4 7 1.139 1.187
26 0.9 8 1.130 1.125
27 0.5 9 1.139 1.162
28 0.5 10 1.139 1.177
29 0.1 10 1.144 1.201
30 0.5 11 1.139 1.143
co n trac t prestige m onth chosen m*
( ' . ) ( • .) m arkup
31 0.2 ¡2 1.139 1.208
32 0.6 1 1.162 1.140
33 0.9 2 1.141 1.110
34 0.3 3 1.140 1.196
35 0.5 3 1.139 1.187
36 0.8 4 1.143 1.183
37 0.1 5 1.139 1.213
38 0.5 6 1.143 1.200
39 0.6 6 1.143 1.159
40 0.5 7 1.144 1.179
41 0.4 8 1.144 1.158
42 0.3 9 1.143 1.158
43 0.9 9 1 153 1.116
44 0.5 10 1.144 1.173
45 0.2 11 1.143 1.214
46 0.6 12 1.153 1.170
47 0.7 12 1.153 1.151
48 0.5 1 1.153 1.148
49 0.5 1 1.144 1.152
50 0.4 2 1.148 1.162
51 0.3 3 1.148 1.219
52 0.7 4 1.153 1.132
53 0.5 5 1.151 1.198
54 0.6 5 1.152 1.158
55 0.5 6 1.153 1.141
56 0.8 6 1.148 1.216
57 0.5 7 1.152 1.196
58 0.1 7 1.151 1.196
59 0.4 8 1.151 1.192
60 0.5 9 1 153 1.219
TAB LE 4.5.6
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5. A  S E Q U E N T IA L  F R I E D M A N  T Y P E  M O D E L
This chapter considers the same problem as chapter 4, that is once again we shall be assisting 
an individual bidder. We mirror the work o f  chapter 4 by presenting a sequential Friedman 
type model, that is, a model based directly on the random variables X x, . . .  , X n, the actual 
bids o f our n  competitors. We still make the same basic assumptions that C  II p(m ) and that 
the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. A  feature o f the model is that it incorporates 
a dependency structure on our competitors bids by noting their com m on variation in cost 
estimates. Thus in this chapter we tend to  work in terms o f bids rather than markups.
The model requires information about w ho has been invited to bid on each contract as well 
as the actual value o f  bids made. Thus the m odel will be appropriate in an environment where 
we would expect to  receive substantially more information about a contract than in the last 
chapter.
5 .1 Bidding On a Single Contract.
One recurring feature of the litereature on  the Friedman and Gates models is that the Gates 
formula performs better in simulations, see for example Benjamin 8  Meador (1979). This is 
not suprising since the Gates formula does at least impose some dependency on X t , . . .  ,X „ ,  
although the form o f  this dependency is not easily identifiable. The Friedman formula assumes 
them to be independent, an assumption which is extremely unlikely to  be true in practice. It 
thus seems sensible to  attempt to  isolate the source o f dependency between X x , . . .  , X n , in 
order that we may put a more realistic prior on X . Note that throughout this section we are 
assuming we have no specific knowledge o f  any one company, and thus arc looking for a prior 
distribution to  reflect only what is general knowledge or logically obvious about a competitors 
bids.
An easily identifiable type o f  dependency is a ‘common environment’ dependency similar 
to  that discussed in the reliability litereature, see for example Lindley 8  Singpurwalla (1984). 
This form o f dependency arises, since all our competitors bids will start with an asessment of 
the cost o f the contract to them, see Ward 8  Chapman (1988). This cost asessment is in turn 
a function o f  external factors, such as raw material prices, which are applicable to all bidders.
Thus all the bids are functions o f their ‘ com m on environment’ , in this case raw material prices. 
This suggests a competitors bid may be decom posed as follows;
for » =  1 , . . .  , n. Where C  is a random variable representing the cost o f  the contract to the 
bidder, and is common to all bidders. Afi is a random variable representing the markup F,
companies it is reasonable to take M i , . . .  , M n to  be exchangeable random variables. 
Taking logs, (5.1.1) becomes;
The exchangeability o f M i } . . .  , M n means we can write log Mx =  log M ' +  log M [ where 
M [ , . . .  , M'n are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. The lognormal 
is often a good  distribution for cost random variables, so if  it is assumed C  is distributed 
lognormal, and that log M't and log M '  are distributed locally normal, (5.1.2) is equivalent to 
the following normal random effects m odel for log X i , see Box 8  T iao (1973).
a so called ‘ intraclass’ matrix, / „  being the n x  n  identity matrix. This is in turn the same as 
saying log X i , . . .  , log X n are exchangeable random variables.
Xi =  C M , (5.1.1)
puts on to  his cost asessment for profit. Since it is assumed we are uninformed about the
log X i =  log C  +  log Mi (5.1.2)
log  ^  =</> +  € +  e. (5.1.3)
where
^  =  constant unknown parameter =  E[log C  +  log Mi) 
€ =  (log M 'C  -  E [log  M ‘C\) ~  W(0,«r2), say 
U =  (lo g M'i -  E [log M'i]) ~  W (0 ,r2), say
and C i,. . .  , e„  are i.i.d. random variables. Which is equivalent to having
(log X j , . . .  , log X „ ) — Nn ( ¿ e „ , £ ) (5.1.4)
where e „  is the n  x  1 vector o f ones, and £  is given by
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It is worth noting that many authors have assumed normality for costs and bids and not
lognormality as in (5.1.4), see for example Naert 8  Weverbergh (1978). There is however 
rarely, if ever, any attempt to  justify this assumption.
It will prove convenient to consider the following reparameterisation. Let p and v be defined 
by
Consider now computing the probability that we win the contract with bid 6 when competing 
against Fl t . . .  ,F n , i.e. p (6). Where
O f course p(b) =  p (b ,p ,v ) =  p (b ,a 3, r2). The parameter we are particularly interested in is p, 
since this allows us to quantify the dependency between com peting companies, thus we will 
denote p (6) as p (6,p ), suppressing the dependency on v.
Firstly we note that p(b ,p) is simply an orthant probability for the multivariate normal 
random variable log X i , . . .  , log X n . So it can be computed using any one o f the standard 
numerical techniques for calculating such probabilities, see for example the methods outlined 
in Johnson 8  Kotz (1972). However we can also use the following form  which will prove useful 
later,
where Z  ~  JV(0,1) and 9  is the standard normal distribution function. This is easily shown
then clearly
p =  correlation (log X i , log X j ) >  0 
and v  =  variance (log X i)
for all i , j
for all i
p(b) =  p(b < X 1 D . . . n b  < X n)
— p(log 6 < log X i  n . . .  n  log 6 <  log x n )
(5.1.5)
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as follows.
This may now be described as a normal ‘exchangeable blocks’ model for log bids, since, as 
before, it is equivalent to having log-K*, ~  N(tt>,,Vj) for all i , j  with l o g , . . .  , lo g X rjy 
being exchangeable for all j .  That is, log bids are exchangeable only within their own block, 
or environment.
If we go  on to make the assumption that bids in different blocks are independent then p(b,p) 
is simply given by
j
P ( b>p) =  1 1 ^  (&./»)
where p^fc.p ) is the probability o f beating all competitors in block j ,  and is computed as 
before. Hence we need only analyse further the one block model.
Before moving on to  the sequential model we briefly consider a comparison between the 
above exchangeable model and the Friedman and Gates models with a lognormal distribution 
on bids.
Define the probability o f winning the contract with bid b to be PF(b),pG(b) and p(b ,p) when 
using the Friedman, Gates and exchangeable models respectively.
In the case considered previously, where we are equally uninformed about all o f  our com­
petitors, we have
M  i) = ?” Pr.W= [i + n(1~ yj]
and p (6,p ) is computed using (5.1.5). Where, from (5.1.4)
q =  p {b <  X ,)  =  * ( ^ - J ^ )  for a li i
V v
The following lemma provides some insight in to the relative behaviour o f PF (b),pa{b) and
P{b,p)
Lemma 5 .1 .7 .
For any given 4>, v and n >  1, we have;
( 1 ) p (b ,p ) is an increasing function o f  p, for all b
(2) p /-(6) =  p(b, 0) for all b
( 3 )  p o (e * )  =  p ( e * , J ) = ;ii T
(4) p (6 ,0 ) <  pG{b) <  p(b, 1) for all b, |6| < oo
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PROOF:
(1) The result follows directly from  Slepians inequality, see Tong (1980).
(2) from (5.1.5) p(b ,0 ) =  E [ { * ( * ^ ) } - )  =  q" =  pF (b).
(3) again from  (5.1.5) p(e*, y ) =  E [ (& (Z ) )") =  ¡j^y , since $ (Z )  is ditributed uniform on 
[0,1]. Also P a {e* )  =  since q =  | when b =  e* .
(4) from (5.1.3) we have p (6, 1) =  q since =  0 for all i  when p =  1. So
Figure 5.1.8 shows pF (b), pa (b), p(b, y ) and p(b, 1) for the specific case tf> =  log 100, v =  1 
and n — 3. However lemma (5.1.7) tells us that this will be the form o f  these functions for 
all v and n, with p(b,p) for p ^  % being similar to  p (6, y ), but shifted either up or  down 
depending on whether p >  y or p <  y respectively.
Bearing in m ind that we are likely to be bidding near to, or slightly below e* , we conclude 
that when we are equally uninformed about our com petitors, use o f the Gates model is similar 
to using the exchangeable model with correlation o f  ^ or slightly below y . Whilst use o f  the 
Friedman formula is identical to using the exchangeable model with zero correlation.
q 1 +  (1 -  ?)•«
<  q =  p(b, 1) for n > 1
also
n ( l  -  q) n (l -  q)
=  1 H---------------- +  positive terms >  1 +  —-------- - for n >  1
7 7
thus
□
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5.2 Bidding on a Sequence o f Contracts.
We consider first the case where our company is bidding on a sequence o f identical contracts 
i.e. the cost distribution is the same at each time period . It is then shown how the results 
obtained for this case are easily extended to a sequence o f  contracts with different costs.
Ideally we would like to use the model derived for X  in the previous section purely as a 
prior setting, and then allow ourselves to learn about each X i completly freely. That is, let 
each X , have a different mean and variance, and each X , , X ,  pair have a different correlation. 
An appropriate analysis may be the standard Norm al-W ishart analysis, see De Groot(1970). 
The problem with this type o f  model lies in the form o f  data we are to receive. If we have n 
competitors, then at each time period we will observe the bids o f  a subset o f these competitors, 
and o f  course a different subset at each time period. W e will describe this as ‘censored’ data, 
since at each time period we can view our observations as a censored value o f  the single 
multivariate observation X i t . ..  ,X n . It is quickly seen that the structure o f  a free running 
model, such as the Normal-Wishart, breaks down with censored data, and leads to  calculations 
which are extremely difficult even numerically. Note that th is censoring is o f course not random, 
since it is determined by the tendering organisations ch oice o f  companies to  bid. There is, thus, 
the possibility o f  learning about the tendering organisations policy in selecting companies to 
bid. A  model that can cope with this censored data is a lso  o f  course capable o f  coping with 
missing observations. This may well prove useful, as the possibility o f  not being able to  find 
out a companies bid is quite real.
For the rest o f  this paper we make the assumption th a t the exchangeable blocks structure 
remains over time. This assumption will enable us to co p e  with the censored data mentioned 
above. If each competitor is in a separate block this m odel will be equivalent to the Friedman 
model with the lognormal distribution on bids, since com petitors bids will be independent. As 
in the previous section we need only analyse one block.
Let X , (t) be the bid o f the i*h competitor, in the particular block being considered, at time 
t, * =  1 , . . .  ,n , and let Yi(t) =  log A ,(t). Then our likelihood at time t is specified by
MO.- - .n.(0 ~ * r.W K .,E (0 ) (5.2.1)
where £ ( 0  =  a2 ( t ) I „  +  r 3(t)er, is the intraclass m atrix specified previously, and rt is the
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number o f  bids we are observing from this block at time t. This suggests th a t for our Bayesian 
analysis we will need a prior distribution across <£(0),r2(0) and <r3(0). H owever, an important 
simplification to our likelihood can be made. As noted previously, at t =  0 , (5.2.1) is equivalent 
to the model
Y, (0 ) =  ¿ (0 ) +  e(0) +  u  (0) (5.2.2)
where ^(0) is a ‘ fixed effect’ and c(0) ~  fV(0,<72(0) ) is a ‘ random effect’ . S ince we are about to 
put a prior on ^ (0) and thus effectively make it also a random effect, « (0 ) can  be interpreted 
as a fixed effect w ith prespecified prior distribution c(0) ~  N (0 ,a 2(0) ) .  S o (5.2.2) can be 
rewritten
y,(o) = *'(o) + c.(o)
where <f>' =  <f> +  e is a fixed effect. This leads to the simplified likelihood,
M O . - -  , n , ( 0  -  t f r . ( * '( 0 « r , ,r a( 0 / „ )  (5.2.S)
<r2(0) is no longer relevant, as it does not appear in the likelihood, however we are compelled 
to put a normal prior on e(0), so consider the following prior structure;
*'(0)|rI (0 )~ A r (m o,^ i® > )  (5.2.4)
<*0
where m0 ,a 0 ,a 0 , b0 are prior parameters, and G ~ l denotes the inverse G am m a distribution 
with p .d.f., p (r2) oc r -2 ( *+0, e z p ( - 6/ r 2), which is a commonly used prior fo r  variances. Note 
that this prior, which is in fact conjugate for the likelihood (5.2.3), also includes the standard 
uninformative priors for <t>' and r2 , for when a 0 =  <to =  b0 =  0  (5.2.4) becom es
P(*'(0)) «  1 p(r2(0)) «
Define (5.2.4) as being equivalent to saying ^ '(0 ) ,r 2(0) ~  N G ~ l (m o ,a o ,a o ,b o )-  If we now 
make the inductive assumption
<t>'(t -  l ) , r 2(t -  l)|y ‘ _1 ~  N G -1(m t- i ,a t - l ,a t - i ,bt- l )
where y ,_1 is all the data up to time t — 1, Bayes theorem tells us that
« P( Y ( i ) | / ( 0 , . ’ (O ) > ) |y " ')
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which, with a little manipulation, yields
¿ ' ( 0 »r 2(*)|y(0 >y‘  1 ~  N G
where
<*«-i +  U
* • = * • - 1  +  + y T (l)y(f)) (5.2.5)
The crux o f our problem is, given the observation at the current time period, to compute the 
probability we beat a given number o f  competitors, r ,+ 1 say, from this block at the next time 
period. This necesitates calculating a  predictive distribution i.e. the distribution o f Y ( t  +  l)|y‘ . 
This is given by
Before discussing the problem o f  calculating the probability o f beating the rf+ 1 competitors in 
this block, we look at a couple o f  generalisations o f the predictive distribution (5.2.6).
Firstly we return to the problem o f  bidding on a sequence o f contracts with different cost 
random variables. Our model already assumes that a company’s markup is independent of 
the cost o f the contract. If we go on  to  assume that the Var[\ogCt ] is constant, then we can 
standardise with respect to the mean and variance o f the log cost distribution. Thus our model 
becomes
p (Y (l +  l ) ^ )  =  f  ~ J~ p(Y(! +  l ) | l . r X / . r V W * 1
which yields
Y ( i+ l)| y ‘ ~ T aa,(m ,ert+l,S;) (5.2.6)
a multivariate t-distribution with 2ot degrees of freedom and
*[Y (I +  l)|y*J =  m,er C o « [Y (l+  l)|y-l =  S, =  - +  '‘ ' ■ " ’ ' " A
Of -  1 V. Q! /
*7(0  = *"(*) + < (0
where
Y ‘  ( 0  =  standardised data =  ^ — —
9
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lt = E [logC t ] and g2 =  Var [logC ,]. Our updating o f parameters is exactly as in (5.2.5) with the 
standardised data replacing y (t ) . Not forgetting that the parameters m ,,a ( , a , , 6f now relate 
to the random variables Y * (t )  and The predictive distribution (5.2.6) now becomes
Y (t  +  l)|y« ~  T2a, (  ( /,+ 1 +  gm , )er, + . , g2S ,) (5.2.7)
Recalling that C, is distributed lognormal and so log C t is distributed normal, if ct =E [C ( ], 
then we have /, =  logc, — g 2/2. Also, V ar[C t \ =  c2(eai — 1), thus our assumption about 
constant log cost variance is equivalent to saying Var\Ct ] is directly proportional to c2. A 
more precise interpretation o f  the parameters m ,, a t , at , 6, ,  and suggested prior settings, are 
given in the next section.
Exactly as in §4.2 it is desirable to model a companies behaviour changing with time. A 
natural way to model this drift is to let the parameters <f>" ( t ) , r2 (t) develop with the power 
steady model with parameter k, this yields
This is the most general form  o f  predictive distribution we shall look at.
Consider now the setting o f  the parameter k. First we note that values o f  k close to 1 
represent a small amount o f drift o f information, and it is in this region that we are likely to 
choose k. Since the drift o f information is steady the parameter k  should clearly be related to 
the time between contracts. Consider for example setting
~  t a , - ,  +  | ( t -  1 ), * » ,_ , )
the updating in (5.2.5) then becomes
rot-ifca,-! +  r,y(t) 
ka, _ x +  r,
6, =  *6 ,_ , +  i(* a t_ im ?_1 -  a,m,2 + y T (t)y(t)) (5.2.8)
and the predictive distribution becomes
Y (t  +  l)|y ‘  ~  T3*a,+3(fc_ 1)( (/t+1 +  gmt )e r,+ 1 ,g2S,') (5.2.9)
l - t = ( l - A ) |
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where 6 is the time interval between the tendering o f the last contract and the tendering o f this 
one, and ¿o is some base time period, for example the average time between contracts. Note, 
if two contracts are put out simultaenously, then 6 — 0, k =  1 and there is no discounting of 
information. The parameter A thus represents the drift in information over the constant time 
interval 60 ■ If 6q is reasonably small, values o f A as high as .99 may not be inappropriate.
We now consider the problem o f computing the probability that we beat r(+ j competitors 
in a given block, with bid 6, denote this by p,(b) so
where Y (t  +  l)|y‘  is distributed as in (5.2.9). The following provides a m ethod for doing this.
and W (0, 1 ) ,  S ~ x 2( .
This is shown by noting that C o v (Y (t  +  1 ))  has an intraclass structure. This means, from 
the definition o f  the multivariate t-distribution, we can write
where »j(t) ~  N (0 ,d ,k a ,/ (k a , +  1 ) ) , tj¡(t) ~  N (0 ,d ,) , ( ( t ) ~  x £ ,, and ,r j„ ,£  are
mutually independent. The result follows by similar manipulations to those used in establishing 
(5.1.5).
Thus, as in §5.1, we can use a Monte-Carlo m ethod to compute pt (b). If we generate an 
independent random sample ( z i , * i ) , . . .  , ( z „ , s „ )  from  a N (0 ,1) and x l ,  distribution, then an 
estimate o f p, (b) is u =  JZ /n where
Note that to generate a X^t observation we use the result that if  Zl t . . .  , Zm are i.i.d iV (0 ,1) 
then E ?  Z?  ~  *m •
Pt(b) =  p (log b <  y i ( t +  i ) n , . . .  ,n l o g 6 < Kr,+l (t  +  i)|y‘ )
M b )  = L  L~ [*(‘/ ka, _  ( lo g b p,)y/akatt +  1 y/vtdt
(5.2.10)
where i/, =  2*0, +  3 (*  -  1), pt = B ( K ( I + 1 )1 ^ ]  =  !,+  ! + # « ,
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If r, + 1 =  1 our predictive distribution is o f  course a univariate t-distribution, and so the 
Monte-Carlo m ethod is unneccesary. Indeed, since i/t is likely to be large, see the next section, 
the following approximation is very good ;
)  ( M . . X
where f,=sign o f  (log  b -  Mt)-
It is now neccessary to compute our optim al bid for time t +  1 by maximising the expected 
profit function p r o / (6) =  (6 -  ct+ l )p ,(b ). The suggested method for doing this is to compute 
Pt(b) at a small number o f points, 6 or 8 maybe, using the Monte-Carlo method outlined above, 
and then fit cubic splines through these points, see Atkinson (1978) pp 143-149 for a simple 
account o f how to  d o  this. Once these splines have been fitted, any number o f  values o f Pt(b) 
are easily com puted. The maximum is then obtained using some simple direct search method 
on p rof(b ), or even graphically.
5.3 A n  Illustrative Exam ple.
A t every time period we are to com pete against 4 companies whom we have decided will 
com e from 2 exchangeable blocks. Before setting the prior parameters m o ,a o ,a o ,b 0, for each 
block, we set g2 =  Var[logC «]. The way to  do this is simply to state an interval, (L,U ), in 
which we are almost certain logC , will lie. An estimate o f  g is then given by g =  (U  -  L)/6 , 
using the fact that log Ct is normal, and normal random variables are almost certain to lie 
within 3 standard deviations o f their mean. Looking at our cost estimates below we shall thus 
use g =  0.2. For the purposes o f  this exam ple this is a somewhat rough and ready estimate, 
a practitioner would presumably be able to  specify a reasonably accurate range for log Ct . As 
noted earlier /, is now given by /, =  log c , -  g*/2 .
To set m o,cto ,ao,bo, we note that for the general predictive distribution (5.2.9) these pa­
rameters have the following interpretations. First, mo =  E [log M,]/g, where M, is the markup 
taken by a company in this block. For these fairly vague prior settings it is not unreasonable 
to take E[log Af<] ~  logE [A f,], and so, taking E[Afi] =  1.15, we shall set mo =  0.7 for both 
blocks. Large values o f  a0 correspond to  greater confidence in our setting o f  mo, since the 
prior on 4>" becomes more peaked. Indeed we have already mentioned that oco =  0 corresponds
78
Details o f the costs o f  the seven contracts we will consider are given in the following table. 
All costs and bids are in /TOO’s.
t 1
c, 100
l, 4.585
2
110
4.680
3
105
4.634
4 5 6 7
90 120 80 90
4.480 4.767 4.362 4.480
A summary o f the analysis showing the updating of the parameters and the observed bids 
for each block are shown in tables 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. Details o f  our optimal bid at each time 
period are shown in the table below.
t i 2 3 4 5 6 7
Optimal 106.3 118.4 113.7 97.5 129.7 86.4 97.3
Bid (5)
m .34 .47 .54 .57 .51 .57 .55
Expected
profit 2.1 3.9 4.7 4.3 4.9 3.7 4.0
To illustrate the model in action we look in detail at the computation o f  the optimal bid for 
time t =  3. If p*(6) =  p(we beat all com petitors in block i with bid 6), i =  1 ,2 , then using 
(5.2.11) for block 1 and the Monte-Carlo m ethod for block 2 the following probabilities were 
computed.
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Bid 105 110 115 117.5 120 122.5 125 130
p ' m .992 .950 .804 .680 .533 .384 .254 .086
i ’ W .925 .795 .570 .440 .317 .215 .135 .045
Figure 5.3.3 shows the smoothed curves obtained by fitting cubic splines through these 
points. Note that p (6) =  p( we beat all competitors with bid b)=  p ‘ (6)p3 (6).
Figure 5.3.4 shows the expected profit function, (6 -  105)p(6), for which the maximum is 
achieved at b =  113.7.
We see that our prior settings lead us to start off bidding quite conservatively. The result 
being that we win all the early contracts, with relatively small expected profits. However as 
we learn about our competitors we start to bid more adventurously and increase our expected 
profit, at least as a percentage o f  cost.
A t first sight these results may seem strange, since a model which instructs us to bid so 
consistently low initially will, in practice, force our competitors to reduce their bids resulting 
in lower profits all round. However the important point is that after a number o f contracts 
we are bidding more competitively, suggesting that the initial bids are due to the reasonably 
vague settings o f  m o ,a 0 ,ao, 60. In a practical situation we would expect to have past data on 
contracts. This could be used to  arrive at more sensible settings o f  m 0, a0 , a0 , 60 simply by 
starting with vague settings and running the past data through the model -  once the model 
has settled down and is producing sensible bids the corresponding values o f m t,a f ,a , , 6t can 
be used as the prior setting.
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6. R E C O N C IL IN G  T H E  F R I E D M A N  A N D  G A T E S  M O D E L S
In this chapter we consider ourselves to  be an external observer attempting to model the 
behaviour o f all the competing bidders. T he main question we answer is motivated by the 
fact the Dirichlet Gates type model, now parameterised by a 0 ) . . .  ,a „  which are no longer 
functions o f  m, can be fully updated with ju st the knowledge o f the identity o f  the winner 
o f each contract. The question is, what Friedman type model would also require only this 
information to  fully update itself ? In the next section we show that this is not possible with 
any non-degenerate countably additive distribution across X , , . . .  ,X „ .  In §6.2 we show that 
it is possible with a finitely additive distribution. Properties o f  these distributions are then 
explored.
6 .1  A n  Im p o ss ib ility  T h eorem .
Consider the Dirichlet Gates type model o f  §4.1 used as a model for an external observer. In 
this case the model can work on the formal hypothesis that for each contract tendered we are 
only told the identity o f  the winner. In practice a company will often have more information 
than this. So we might ask the question as to  when we are formally justified in discarding all 
information other than r (t ) , and thus justified in using the model o f  §4.1 even when we have 
extra information ? For this we need to  define a general class o f models. An obvious choice 
is the class o f  Friedman type models described by a distribution across the actual bids o f n 
companies X 1, . . .  ,X n .
Define the vector I  = / , , . . .  , / n to rank the order o f bids X l t . . .  ,X n. Thus /,  =  j  implies 
that company F}  produced the i*h lowest bid. A  slight generalisation of our question is now 
whether, for a single contract, there are probability distributions across the n-tuple o f com­
pany’s bids X  =  X , , . . .  , X „  such that 0, the vector o f probabilities o f  who wins this contract, 
is independent o f  X i , 1 <  * <  n , given an arbitary function o f  I  ? If this can be answered 
in the affirmitive then the types o f models used in chapter 4 will also be formally justifiable 
models to use when we have additional inform ation available to  us. An obvious rider to this 
question is —  what are the characteristics o f  such distributions, and do they provide realistic 
looking models that at least approximate structures we might expect to see in the bidding 
environment?
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First suppose the whole o f I  is known to all competitors. Because the interpretation we have 
chosen for the vector 0 only concerns statements about the order statistics Y  =  (Y i , . . .  , V",,) 
o f  X , where Yi =  X ^ ), 1 <  i  <  n, it is convenient, as in Lane 8  Sudderth (1979), to construct 
the distribution o f X  from a distribution on the pair ( I ,Y )  where I  indicates the order o f the 
components o f  X  and is defined above.
Clearly the mass function o f I|0 satisfies
p ( l| # )= p ( ,1|#)p(,-3 l . ..
where i  =  . , in . And if r  is sufRcent for 0, as in the Dirichlet model,
pOW = * .p(«2, In) (6.1.1)
If we now choose a distribution on the order statistic Y  such that
Y  U (# ,I )  (6.1.2)
this will give us an induced distribution on X  from which we can learn about 0 only through 
I. On the other hand if, conditional on I, Y  is dependent on 0 then more might be learned 
about 0 by learning about some component o f X .
So it is clear that if we always learn about the total ordering I  o f  the competing com pany’s 
bids a model satisfying (6 .1 .2) will allow us to legitimately discard all other information about 
the actual value o f bids as irrelevant to our future forecasts. A nd if  in addition (6.1.1) holds 
and 0 11 (7a , . . .  , / „ )  | / ,  the identity o f  the winner o f the contract is all that is needed to fully 
update our distribution.
Is it possible to  go further than this ? In practice it is rare for any company to be given the 
value o f I. For example, he might only learn that he did not win, or the identity o f the winner, 
or the identity o f  the winner and his own position. Clearly given only a  non-monotone function 
o f  I , the actual value o f bids may need to be used to update the distribution on 0. Usually 
each company will at least know the value o f its own bid X , . So a minimal requirement 
that would allow us only to use functions of order statistics to update our beliefs is that X  
be order independent (o.i.) -  that is, for any interval A  the event X i e  A  is independent o f I,
1 <  i <  n.
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If X  is o.i. with the additional information about the value o f their own bid, each firm using 
an o.i. distribution should update the the vector 0 only through the information they learn
and assume that the joint distribution across X it X j  satisfies P (X i <  X,-) <  1 and 
P {X i >  X j )  <  1. This sim ply precludes the case where the supports o f  Xi and X j  do 
not overlap, since then the distribution across X i , X j  is trivialy order independent. W e now 
have;
T heorem 6.1.4.
If, for some pair i , j  (1 <  * j  <  n), all the events o f  the form Ax =  {X* >  x }  and 
A!x =  {X j  >  x }  are independent o f  I { i , j ) ,  and P(Xi — X j )  =  0, then the distribution across 
X l t . . .  ,X n cannot be countably additive.
Permuting i  and j  in the above, conditioning on I ( i , j )  =  0 and using that A'z II I { i , j )  gives
about I. We now show that o .i. is not a property o f o f any non-degenerate countably additive 
distribution on X . Define I ( * , j )  as
(6.1.3)
PROOF:
P{X,  >  x | / ( . , »  =  1) =  P{Xi >  x  | X, >  X ,)
=  P{Xi >  x  | Xi >  Xj >  x )P (X j > x) +  P(Xi >  *  | Xi >  Xj =  x)P(Xj =  x)
+  P{Xi  >  XI X i >  z >  X j )P (X ,  >  X >  Xj)  +  P(X, > X IX >  Xi > X} )P(x  > Xi)
=  P (X j  >  x ) +  P(X,  =  x) +  P{X, >  x  > X,)
But since Ax II I ( i , j ) , P(Xi > x \ I ( i , j )  =  1) =  P{Xi > x) thus,
P{Xi > x )  =  P (X j  >  x )  +  P(Xj  =  x) +  P(X, > x  >  X,) (6 .1 .5)
P(X ,  > x )  =  P{Xi  >  x) +  P(Xi  =  x) +  P{Xj  > x > X .) (6 . 1.6)
Adding (6.1.5) and (6.1.6) and using the positivity o f  probability we find
P (X , >  x >  Xj) =  P (X ,  >  x > X .)  =  0 for all x  £  R (6.1.7)
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and
P (X , =  z )  =  P (X ,  =  z )  =  0 for all x e  R
N ow since P (X i =  X t )  =  0 we can, without loss o f generality, assume that
P (X i <  X y) > 0  (6.1.8)
If the (X i , X } ) are countably additive then
P {X , < * , ) <  P ( ( X , , X , )  e  Bt ) (6.1.9)
a . e f l
where B =  {B * }  is any countable open covering o f  { ( x , ,  Zy)|xt- < x , } .  Well if 
Bz =  { (Xj , Xj) | x, <  x  <  Xy}
then S =  {B * |x rational }  forms such an open covering, since the rationale are dense in R. 
But from (6.1.7)
P ( (X itX , )  €  Bm) =  P (X , <  x  <  X , )  =  0
thus from (6.1.9)
P (X , < X j )  =  0
this contradicts our assumption (6.1.8). It thus follows th a t X , ,X ,  cannot be jointly countably 
additive, hence X i t . ..  ,X n cannot be jointly countably additive. □
So order independence is not a property o f countably additive distributions. However De 
Finetti (1974), Heath 0  Sudderth (1978), Sudderth (1981) and Fishburn (1986) have all ar­
gued strongly that there is no convincing logical argum ent that Bayesian models should ex­
hibit countably additive distributions on observables. Finitely additive priors are often used 
in an analysis and can be justified both theoretically, as models exhibiting certain forms of 
invariance, see Eaton (1982), and pragmatically, as close approximations to  countably additive 
distributions which are computationally messy.
6.2 Characterising Order Independent D istrib ution s.
In this section we construct a finitely additive joint distribution across the random variables 
X l t . . .  ,X n , which is order independent, and hence establish that such a distribution can exist. 
We then go on to partially characterise the class o f  o.i. distributions.
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Let Y  =  (Y i, . . .  ,Yn)  and define Y, by
where Yx has an arbitary left continuous distribution, and e3, .. 
positive random variables each with a distribution satisfying
for i >  2
, are identically distributed
1 if i4 C (0, rj) 
otherwise
for all x] >  0 (6 ,2,1)
Note that the distribution function of e, is not right continuous at zero. It thus follows that t, 
is not countably additive, 1 <  » <  n.
Consider now the random  variable X  =  ( X t , . . .  , X n) defined by dem anding that its order 
statistic will be Y , i.e. Yi =  X (i) , together with some distribution on its ordering I .
We now prove a series o f  results that allow us to  deduce that the distribution implied on X  
has the property o f order independence.
Lemma 6.2.2.
I f  f* =  Ci, then e‘  has a distribution satisfying (6.2.1) for all t.
PROOF:
From (6.2.1) we know that for all i 
Thus
e  ( » . ¿ ¡ 4 i ) )  =  />(«• e  (0, 6))  =  l
so e‘  also has the property (6 .2.1 ). □
for all t] > 0
for all r) >  0
Lemma 6.2.3.
I f  Z  is a random variable with left continuous distribution function and c has the property 
(6.2.1), then for any interval A,
P (Z  +  e €  A ) =  P (Z  €  A)
PROOF:
Since the distribution o f  Z  is left continuous it is suflicent to prove that
P ( Z e [ a ,h ) )  =  P (Z  +  t €  [a,6) )
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for any finite interval [a, 6). Clearly, since e >  0,
P (Z  < b ) >  P (Z  +  < <  b) (6  2 .4)
and from (6 .2 .1 )
P {Z  +  e <  6) >  P (Z  <  b - r j )  for all rj >  0 (6 .2 .5)
that is for all r) >  0
P (Z  < b - r j ) <  P (Z  +  ( < b ) <  P (Z  <  b) 
which implies P (Z  +  e <  b) =  P (z  <  6).
Similarly, since c >  0
P {Z  >  a) <  P {Z  +  e > a)
and from (6 .2.1 )
P (Z  +  e >  a) <  P (Z  > a -  T}) for all r) >  0
that is, for all ij >  0
P (Z  >  a) <  P (Z  +  e >  a) <  P (Z  > a -  rj) 
which implies P (Z  +  e >  a) =  P (z  >  a).
Also, since the distribution o f Z  is left continuous, it follows that P (Z  =  a) =  P (Z  +  e =  
a) = 0.
Hence the result follows. □
Note that if Z  is countably additive the left continuity condition means Z  must be continuous. 
If Z  is discrete, the distribution o f Z  +  e is different from Z  in that its distribution function 
fails to be right continuous at the points with probability mass on them. This also means that 
the distribution o f Z  +  e is not countably additive.
Lemma 6.2.3 shows us that, provided is left continuous, Y l t Y3 , . . . ,Y n all have the same 
probability o f  lying in any interval A. This in turn means that X l t . . .  ,X n each assign the 
same probability to lying in A. Thus we can say
P ( X t € A )  =  P ( X <  €  A  | X i  =  Y , )  =  P ( X ,  €  A l l )  for all i j
=  P { Y , e  A \ X , =  Y j )  =  P ( Y }  €  A )  (6.2.6)
since by the construction (6.1.2) Y  II I. Since (6.2.6) holds for all intervals A , we have 
constructed an o.i. distribution on X .
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Before continuing we note the following definitions concerning types o f finitely additive 
distributions.
Let * ( .)  be an unconditional probability defined on a sample space Q, and let H  =  
{ / f i ,  f f3, . . .  }  be a countable partition o f  fl. x (.) is said to be purely finitely additive if, 
for all e >  0, there exists a partition, H , o f  fi such that
Furthermore x(.) is said to be strongly finitely additive if there exists a  partition, H , such that 
* ( //< ) =  0 for all i
If we assume P ( X i  =  X ,  ) =  0 for all i , j ,  i  ^  j ,  then we have the following 
T heorem 6.2.7.
i f  X  satisfies the conditions o f  Theorem 6.1.4 then the distribution o f X .  is strongly Bnitely 
additive
PROOF:
Define Bx ( i , j )  as follows
B , ( i , j ) =  ,x„\Xi <  x  < x , }
and Bx as
B . =  U
!<•>><"
then clearly C =  {B x \x rational } forms an open covering o f R /{xi t . . .  ,x n|*i =  ••• =  *»»}• 
Also
!<• # /<"
since X i , X j  II I ( t , j )  implies P (B x ( i , j ) )  =  0 as in Theorem 6.1.4.
Thus the covering C has zero probability, it therefore follows that there exists a partition of 
R / { * l t . . .  ,x„|*i = . . .  =  * „ }  with zero probability. Hence, since P (X i =  X j )  =  0 for all i , j ,  
the distribution on X l t . . .  ,X „  is strongly finitely additive. □
Clearly this result implies the strong finite additivity o f  o.i. distributions.
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We now show that the property (6.2.1) o f  finitely additive distributions is necceaaary for o.i. 
if all random variables are bounded above and below.
Lemma 6.2.8.
Let tj, =  Xi -  X j ,  where X itX j satisfy the conditions o f  theorem  6.1.4, then, i f  there exists 
a ,f i  such that P (a  <  X k <  0 ) =  l  for all k, \ci, \ satisfies (6.2.1).
PROOF:
As in the proof o f  Theorem 6.1.4 define the region Bx as
B . =  { ( * . , * ; ) ! * .  < * < * , >
and define the set 8(6 )  as follows
B ( 5 ) = 0 B o + t4 a  +  m6 > 0
Then 8(6 )  covers the region |e»y| >  6, thus
P(\tii\ > ( ) <  <  ¿ P ( B .  +ks) — 0
k — 0
since from Theorem 6.1.4 P (B X)  =  0 for all z  €  R.
Since this is true for any 6 >  0 we have
>  * ) = 0  for all £ >  0
which tells us that |c<y| has the property (6 .2 .1 )  □
The first consequence o f  this result is that it characterises o .i. distributions on finite ranges. 
That is (6.2.1) is a neccessary and sufficient condition for a sequence of random variables, 
defined on a finite range, to  be order independent. Another consequence arises from  a result 
o f  Lane 8  Sudderth (1979), as we now discuss. A  sequence o f  random variables X i , X 3>. .. 
is said to  satisfy An if given X l t . . .  , X „ ,  a further observation X n+l is equally likely to 
lie in any o f  the n +  1 intervals =  (X (i), X (i+ l)) i  =  0 , . . .  ,n , where X (0) =  - o o  and 
• ^ ( i » + • • • i X „  — -f-oo, that is
1 = 0 .........n
n +  l
Hill (1988) provides a good review o f the An property.
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Let H „  be a class o f measures /9, defined on X t , . . .  ,X n, which satisfy the following properties
(1) X i , . . .  ,X n are exchangeable under 0
(2) 0 (X .  =  X t )  =  0 for all i . j ,  i  #  j
(3) X i , . . .  ,X n have the An property under /3
Hill (1968) has proved that Hn contains no countably additive measures. Lane 8  Sudderth 
(1979) have firstly proved that Hn is non-empty, and secondly that if  X \ , . . .  ,X „  are bounded 
as in lemma 6 .2.8
P( I * , . ,  -  X (1)| >  t) =  0 for all i  >  0
It immediately follows from  lemma 6.2.8 that Hn is a subset o f  the class o f o.i. measures 
defined on bounded random variables. Or, loosely speaking, o .i. distributions on bounded 
random variables are a generalisation o f exchangeable A „  distributions on bounded random 
variables.
Although lemma 6.2.8 concerned only sets o f  bounded variables its implications extend to 
results on all o.i. distributions by the next result.
Lemma 6.2.9.
Let Z =  ( Z i , . . .  ,Z „ )  where
Zi =  / (X i)  1 <  • <  »
and /  is an arbitrary strictly increasing function. Then i f X  is o.i. so  is Z.
PROOF:
Let I (X )  and I (Z )  indicate the order o f X  and Z  respectively. Then since /  is strictly increasing
I(X >  =  I (Z )
Furthermore, noting that if A  is an interval then so is / (A )
{X,- G A }  II I (X )  for all intervals A
(Zi €  / ( A ) }  II I (Z )
for all intervals / ( A )
Since any interval, B , o f  Z, can be written as B  =  J (A ) for some A , by our construction o f  Z. 
It follows that Z  is o .i. □
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An o.i. distribution with variables Xi defined on  the whole real line can be constructed as 
the image o f an o .i. distribution with variables Zi lying on (0 ,1 ). For example set
In general provided there exists a strictly increasing bounded function /  from X i to Ziy X  
will be o.i. if and only if |«y | =  |Z< -  Z, \ exhibit the property (6.2.1) for 1 <  i  ^  j  <  n.
We shall now construct an o .i. distribution which is not a simple extension o f the An family. 
LEMMA 6 .2 .1 0 .
Let W  have the finitely additive distribution for which
and Z  have any countably additive distribution. I f  J  is a finite union o f  intervals, I  is a 
measurable set and W  II Z  then
(1) P ( W +  Z € J )  =  P ( W  €  J)
(2) P ( w  +  z  €  J  r  z  €  / )  =  P ( w  + z e  J ) P ( Z  e  I )
PROOF:
Since W  is finitely additive and J  is a finite union o f  intervals it is sufficient to prove the result 
for the case when J  is a single interval. So let
The cases when a or 6 are infinite follow from  the definition o f W . When o and h are finite it 
can be seen that P {W  €  J ) =  0  as follows. Clearly
Z, =  (1 +  e~ x , )~
P {W  <  a) =  p  
P {W  >  a) =  1 -  p for all a €  R
for all a e  R
that is
{W  +  Z e  J }  U { Z e l }
a =  inf J  and b =  sup J
where it is possible that a =  —oo or 6 =  + oo .
Result (1) follows immediately from a simple convolution, and we have
o ,b  finite
P (W  +  Z  €  J ) =  P (W  e  J ) =  a =  - o o ,  b finite
— p a finite, 6 =  + oo
1 =  P (W  e  R) =  P (W  <  a u  W  €  (a, b) U W  >  b)
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thus from  the finite additivity o f W
1 = p + P { W  e (a,6)) + 1 - p  =  1 + P ( W  € (a,6))
so P {W  e  (a, 6) ) =  0 for a, b finite.
For (2) assume first that I  is a finite interval with
e =  inf I  and d =  sup I
C ase  I : a, b b o t h  fin ite . Immediately we have
P ( W  +  Z e J n Z € l )  =  P ( w  +  z  e  J ) P ( Z  e  /)
since both  sides are equal to 0.
C ase II: a =  —oo, b finite.
P { W  +  d e j n z e  I)  <  P ( W  +  Z e J n Z e  I )  <  P ( w  +  c e J n Z e  / )  
but P ( w  +  d e J r > Z e I )  =  P ( w  +  c e J r Z e l )  =  PP ( Z  e  / )  since w u z ,  thus 
P ( W  +  Z e J r \ Z e I )  =  PP ( z  e  / )  =  P ( w  +  z  e  J ) P { Z  e  / )  
since P ( W  +  Z  e  J)  =  p 
C ase HI: a f in ite , 6 =  + oo .
P { W  +  d e J r \ Z e  I )  <  P ( W  +  Z  e  J  r  z  e  I)  <  P ( W  +  c e J r Z e  I)
but P ( w  +  d e J n Z e l )  =  P ( w  +  t e J n Z e / )  =  ( i -  p ) P { Z  e  I) since w u z ,  thus
p ( w  +  Z € 7 n Z € / )  =  ( l -  p ) P ( Z  e  / )  =  +  Z  e  J )P (Z  e  /)
since P (W  +  Z e J ) = l - p
So for any finite interval I, and J  as defined above
{w + z e J} u {z e  1}
The countable additivity o f Z  now guarantees result (2 ), since any measurable set I  can be 
constructed as a countable union o f finite intervals. □
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We now construct a class o f  shift invariant o.i. distributions. Define
X  =  Z  +  W ( l , l , . . .  ,1 )T (6.2.11)
Where X  =  ( X , , . . .  ,X n), Z  =  ( Z , , . . .  ,Z n), W  has a distribution satisfying the conditions 
o f  Lemma 6.2.10 and we assume Z  LI W . It is easily seen that X  is o .i. whenever Z  has a 
countably additive distribution. For clearly by (6.2.11)
{X i  G A ]  U Z \ {Z ,}\W ,Z ,
and by Lemma 6.2.10 and (6.2.11)
{X ,  G A ) I I Z ,  (6.2.12)
Also, since W  II Z
W  U Z \ { Z , } \ Z ,
The above imply
( { X ,  €  A ) ,W )  U Z \ {Z ,}| Z ,
which in turn implies
{ X ,  6 -4 )1 1  Z \ {Z ,)| Z ,
This and (6.2.12) now tell us that
{X i  6 -4 )1 1  Z
Thus, since I  is only a function o f  X  through Z  in this model, and the choice o f  i was arbitary 
{X ,  G A ) U I  l < « < n
showing that X  is o.i.
One consequence o f this result is that it illustrates that exchangeable sets o f  o.i. variables 
need not have the A „  property. A s noted earlier Lane & Sudderth (1979) prove that all An 
distributions have the property that the range statistic on the n variables does not have a 
countably additive distribution. The X  defined in (6.2.11) has a range statistic which is 
countably additive, since X („ j  — X (1) =  Z ,„ ,  -  Z (1) and Z  is countably additive.
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We might now ask whether models with the o.i. property are useful ? From a pragmatic 
point o f view we already know that o.i. distributions are useful. The set o f  models outlined 
above contains models whose forecasts agree with those o f  the Gates model, which are known 
to  compare favourably with their competitors. Furthermore it is common for Bayesian models 
to  have vague priors on a location variable and we have show n that shift invariant models have 
the required o.i. property.
It can also be argued that, in many cases, models w ith  the o.i. property provide at least 
a reasonable approximation to realistic dynamics in con tract bidding. For example, a shift 
invariant distribution can be justified as a good model for an observer, and sometimes even a 
decision maker, if he gauges that the magnitude o f  the effect o f  the decision makers action, i.e. 
fixing an appropriate markup, is liable to be swamped by the inherent inaccuracy o f  his cost 
estimates. It is also possible to construct decision m echanisms which directly give rise to o.i. 
models, an example is as follows.
Exam ple.
A firm issues a contract. One company, F, , out o f  n is then invited to bid with probability 
4>t, i 4* =  1, having been told the lowest bid to  date. This is done repeatedly until the 
customer chooses to stop the process. The company Fi knows that if no more bids are invited 
he will win as long as his bid is the lowest. So provided he judges that the probability p ,, 
the probability that the customer stops inviting bids at th is stage t, is independent o f the bid 
he makes he should let his bid, 6, ,  be less than the lowest bid  to date, 6, _ , ,  by a very small 
amount A t , so
b, =  bt - l -  A , A , >  0
Suppose St =  j At is convergent. Then it is clear that the distribution o f  order statisitics 
Y  is as given in this section with y j  having the distribution (possibly unknown to an external 
observer) o f lim<_ <*, bt .
The type o f auction described above does not occur in practice. However when competitors 
know each other well they may perceive this process in their minds -  with their final bid the 
result o f an infinite regress paralleling the auction we have described above.
In such ways it is possible to justify the use o f  o.i. distributions by an observer o f the results 
o f  a competitive bidding process, whether he is inside one o f  the competing firms and knows
their bid or whether he knows no bids. It should be noted however that they are unsuitable 
models for all but the impotent decision maker. However the models in chapter 4 show that 
modification o f o.i. m odels to ones which allow control are possible.
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7. T H E  T E N D E R E R ’ S  D E C I S I O N  P R O B L E M
In this chapter we take the viewpoint o f  the tendering organisation. It is assumed throughout 
that the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. The problem is formulated in the next 
section and related to  the well known M ulti Armed Bandit Problem (M A B P ). The MABP 
is then reviewed and an extension o f  the solution concepts, for the MABP, to the tenderers 
problem is given. The main conclusion is that the tenderers problem, as formulated in §7.1, 
will require simplification in order to be solved fully and used as a base for a practical model 
for the tenderer.
7.1 Formulation of th e problem .
As described in chapter 1 the tenderer’s problem  is, at each time period, to  invite r companies 
from the n possible, to submit a bid on the current contract, whence he incurs a cost equal 
to the minimum o f the bids made by the r companies. An important point to note is that 
the value o f r is fixed, and that the tenderer has no choice as to its value. This is because, 
in practice, organisations have firm guidelines as to the number o f companies who are to be 
invited to bid, o f course without this constraint the tenderer would simply invite as many 
companies as possible to  bid. The choice o f  the companies must be made to minimise the 
expected total cost, or discounted cost, up to  some finite, or infinite, horizon. The dilemma 
facing the tenderer is to strike a balance between choosing, on the one hand, the r companies 
to minimise immediate expected cost, and, on the other, to include little known firms in order 
to learn about their potential for making low bids in the future. For the time being we shall 
assume that the sequence o f  contracts are identical, this condition can then be dropped later 
as in chapter 5. We now formulate this problem  mathematically.
Let X (t )  =  X i  ( t ) , . . .  , X n (t) be a random vector representing the bids that would be made on 
the contract at time t by companies Fl t . . .  , Fn respectively. Assume X t (t) has a distribution 
function Fi(t) which is parameterised by the ‘ state’ vector «¿(t). At each time period the 
tenderer must select a subset o f  X ( t ) ,  X , ( i )  =  X ii ( t ) , . . .  , X ,r (t)  say, whence he incurs cost
* , ( . , ( < ) )  =  m in [ X i t (<), .. , * . ( * ) ]
where s^ t) =  a, , ( * ) , . . .  , « <r(t). After observing X|(t) the states s , ( t ) , . . .  , « „ ( ( )  are updated 
to reflect what the tenderer has learned about F t , . . .  , Fn. Thus the tenderers decision space 
D is given by
P =  {  i | i  =  11 , . . .  , ir is a com bination o f r integers out o f 1 , . . .  , n }
Define U| (t) as the control function at time t, i.e.
“ i (0  =  I
1 if  decision is i at time t 
0 otherwise
So, if we are using geometric discounting with an infinite horizon, the problem is to sequentially 
choose control functions ut(t), t =  0, 1 , . . . ,  to  minimise
It can now be seen that this problem is a generalisation o f  the M ulti Armed Bandit Problem 
(M A B P ). The M A B P was essentially solved by Gittins 8  Jones (1974), see also Gittins (1979). 
W hittle (1980) provided a more structured and pleasing proof o f  Gittins’ results. We now 
provide a brief review o f the Multi Armed Bandit problem, G ittins’ solution and W hittle’s 
proof.
7.2 R evie w  of the M u lti Arm ed B an d it P roblem  and its solution.
Let X ( t )  =  X t ( t ) , . . .  , X n(t)  be a random vector, where X ,( t )  represents the value o f  a
random process » at time t, t =  0 ,1 ,___Exactly as in our problem let P4(t) be the distribution
function o f  X t (t) and let «¿(t) parameterise If we define the reward to be equal to minus
the cost in our problem, and restate the problem  as maximising the expected total discounted 
reward, then the M ABP is equivalent to our problem with the following restrictions:
(1) X i  ( t ) , . . .  ,X „ ( t )  are mutually independent for all t
(2) only one process, j  say, is to be observed at each time period, i.e. r =  1
and D =  { j \ j  =  1 , . . .  ,n }
(3) the updating on states must satisfy «¿(t +  1) =  «,-(*) for * ^  j  , i.e. the states of
Gittins 8  Jones (1974) proved that for each proccess, we can compute an index, G ,(« ,(t )  ), 
such that it is optim al to observe, or continue, the process having the largest index. G j(« j(t ) ), 
the ‘Gittins index’ , can be defined by
E
unobserved processes must remain unchanged
where
R "(si(t +  /)  )  =  E[Æ,(si(t +  /)  ) | Xi observed at times t  +  1 ,1  +  2, . . .  ,< +  /  — !]
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The crucial points about this solution are, firstly, that the index for process G ,, is only a 
function o f the state o f process i, a, . And, secondly, the optimal decision can be ascertained 
simply by forecasting ahead each individual process.
A  pleasing interpretation o f  the Gittins index is as follows.
Consider an individual process, say, and imagine a simplified bandit problem  involving 
processes X , and X u , where X M offers a constant known reward M  at every time period, 
i.e. at each time period the problem is to  choose between observing the random  process X , or 
opting for a known reward M .
Once again assuming geometric discounting and an infinite horizon, the optim ality equation 
for choosing between X, and X M at time t is
* ( « ( 0 > M )  =  m ax{ M  +  A * ( * ( t ) ,M )  , « .(• .(< ) )  +  AE[ * ( « ( !  +  1), A f) ] }  (7.2.1)
Where & (s ,(t ) ,A f)  is the optim al total expected discounted reward, when X t (t)  is in state 
Si(t), and the expectation is with respect to  the state transition a, (<) —* «, (t +  1), which is in 
turn dependent on the observation X ¿(t).
Now clearly, if  it is optim al to  observe X M for the first time at t =  r ,, then, since the state 
o f  X i(t)  will remain unchanged, it will be optim al to observe X M at all following time periods 
t =  r< +  1, T{ +  2 , -----Thus we can rewrite (7.2.1) as
which is equivalent to having the option to retire, from continuing X it at each tim e period and 
collect terminal reward M / ( l  — A).
Hence the optimal policy is o f  the form , ‘continue X t until some time period  r, and then 
retire and collect A f/(1  -  A)’ . Thus
Now define Mi =  M ,(e , (t ) ) as the value o f  M  for which the options o f  continuing X t or X u  
are indistinguishable. Thus from  (7.2.2) we have
*i(si(t),M ) =  max{ M/( 1 -  A) , * ( * ( ! )  ) +  A E [*K (t +  1 ),M )  ] }  (7.2.2)
(7.2.3)
(7.2.4)
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Substituting (7.2.4) in to (7.2.3) yields
E  * * ( » , ( < +  0 )  +  * *1 *  ,_n
Mi
1 -  A
solving for Afj implies
M i __ ElVo1 *'*;(*(« + /))
1 -  A
since u  is the optimal retirement time we have
gr,-o1A,* ( * ( t + D Y
1 -  Ar
i.e. Mi/1 — A is the Gittins index for process i. So the Gittins result says that if we compute 
the constant process equivalent to each random process, then it is optim al to continue the 
random process with the largest constant equivalent. It is common to refer to  M , =  (1  -  A)G, 
as the ‘ indifference value’ for process «.
We now discuss one o f  the most pleasing proofs o f  the optimality o f the Gittins index policy, 
due to W hittle (1980).
W hittle ’s approach was to use what is almost a standard technique for solving this type of 
stochastic control problem, namely
( 1 ) restate the problem as an optimal stopping problem.
( 2) ‘guess’ the optimal stopping rule, and compute the payoff under this rule.
(3) check whether this payoff satisfies the optimality equation.
First some notation and preliminaries. Assume
Let s (t) — (s 1 ( t ) , . . .  , 8n (t) ) and let $ (s )  be the optimal expected total discounted payoff for 
the M ABP. So $  satisfies the optimality equation
for all i and s, (7.2.5)
$  =  max Li 4» (7.2.6)
where the operator Li is defined by
£>,-$(■(*) ) =  Hi (sj  (f) )  +  AE[4>(s(t +  1)) | Xi observed at time t ]
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L em m a  4.
d F (a ,M )  -i-F d<t>,(_8, , M )  
d M  “ I l  d M
Integrating this yields 
L em m a  5.
= * - / ; n
If F (a ,M )  is o f  the form in Lem m a 5 we shall say it is o f  the ‘ W hittle form ’ .
Whittle now showed that this payoff is optimal, and hence that the conjectured policy is 
optimal, by verifying that under certain conditions F (a ,M ),  as in Lemma 5, satisfies the 
optimality equation (7.2.7). These conditions in turn establish the optimality o f the Gittins 
index policy.
Let M (i) =  m a x jfi  M, and define
p, (s , M ) T T  d4>} ( S ] , M )  AA d M
It can immediately be seen that p , ( s ,M )  =  1 if M  >  M {i) . Since if AY > M , ,  4>j(aJtM ) =  M  
as the terminal reward available is greater than the indifference value. So if M  > M , for all 
j  /  » i.e. M  >  M {i) then =  1 for all j  /  i, hence p* =  1.
So if F (s, M ) is o f the W hittle form  integration by parts yields
F [ t ,M ) =  K  -  f K n  a * ' dm s  K  -  [ ”  p ,( . ,  dm
Jm  ,x  dm  JM dm
=  -  lpi(8, m ) ^ ( 8 ,m ) ]^ =M +  J tf>i (s , M ) dp, (s, m)
=  K  -  ( l .K  -  p ,(m ,M )M * ,M ))  +  f  fa (», M ) dp, (a, m)
J M
=  p ,(s ,M )& (8 , A f)  +  f  fa (s, M ) dp, (s , m)
Jm
since K  > M (j, implies Pì (b,K )  =  1 and fa (a i,K ) — K .
(7.2.8)
Suppressing the dependency on s  and the term F (M )  -  L iF (M )  is now formed as,
F (M ) -  L ,F (M )  =  p .(M )i,(M ) +  S .(m )dp.(m ) (7.2.9)
J m
where 5j(m ) =  fa (m ) -  Lifa(m ). Clearly, since fa (m ) satisfies fa (m ) =  m ax(m , L ifa (m ) ) ,  it 
must be that 5*(m) >  0 for all m , which implies F (m ) -  L iF (m )  >  0 for all m.
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Assume now that the following two conditions hold
(i) M  < M,
(ii) Mi > M (i)
By (i) we must have <f>i(M) =  Li<f>i(M) i.e. 6i(M) =  0, since the terminal reward M  is 
less than the indifference value M i , so immediate retirement cannot be optimal. Thus by (i) 
equation (2.2.5) becomes
By (ii) we have that for all m €  [M i , K ], P i ( m )  =  1 and = 0, thus the above integral is
equal to  0, and F (M ) -  LiF(M ) =  0.
We thus have that the optimal payoff is o f the W hittle form if  (i) and (ii) hold. But (i) 
just tells us that retirement is not optim al, and (ii) is equivalent to having M, =  max, M) t 
or equivalently =  m aX jG ,. So the optimality o f the Gittins index policy for the M ABP is 
established.
We conclude this review section by mentioning some o f the existing extensions to the MABP.
An important limitation on the optimality o f a Gittins index policy was proved by Berry 
© Fristedt (1985). They proved that if, in the infinite horizon M ABP, we do not have geometric 
discounting, then a Gittins index policy is not neccesarily optimal.
Nash (1980) considered a M ABP where the reward was not just a function o f  the state o f 
the observed process, but was a function o f all the states, in a multiplicatively separable way. 
i.e. the reward when observing process « was
He then proved that an index policy is optim al, where the optim al index is given by
where <?'(«< (t +  r )  ) =  E[<J,(s, (t +  r ) ) | process « observed at times t , . . .  , t  +  r  — 1 ). And T  
is a restricted set o f  stopping times defined by
M,
« .(• .)  n o - « * . )
77(b) i f  77 (b) is non empty 
Ti otherwise
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where 7\ is the set of all strictly positive stopping times, and
T ; =  { r  | r€  Z and Q ,(s ,)  -  XTQ [(a ,(t +  r ) ) <  0} 
and is o f  course a subset o f  T ,.
Clearly N,(a) can take negative values, and a process with a negative index is always pre­
ferred t o  a process with a positive index. Thus the optimal process to continue is the process 
with the negative index that is largest in modulus, or, if no process has negative index, then 
simply th e  one with the largest index. Intuitively this is acceptable, since N{ (a) <  0 is equiv­
alent to  Q i(e i )  — X +  r ) )  <  0, at the value o f r achieving the supremum. That is, 
continuing process » produces an immediate positive reward, and actually improves the ex­
pected discounted contribution that process i  will make to the total reward in future i.e. 
X 'Q '(s .( t  +  r ) ) > Q , ( s . ) .
Eick (1988) considers the ‘delayed response bandit’ . In this problem the reward for contin­
uing a process, j ,  is not immediately observable, but will be observed at the tth time period 
later w ith  probability 0 ,(1  — ff} ) ‘  for some parameter 0,.
Eick then  proves that, at a particular time period, there exists an optimal index, provided 
either A <  | or there are no outstanding observations at that time period.
7.3 Generalising The M ABP.
Returning to the tenderer’s problem as formulated in §7.1, we shall now view it as a M ABP 
with the following generalisations
G l: A llow  the states o f unobserved processes to change in a deterministic way.
G2: A llow  more than one process to be observed at each time period. The reward being a 
function  o f the states o f  all the observed proccesses.
G3: A llow  processes to be dependent.
Note that generalisation G l will permit us to  let the individual processes develop with the 
Simple Pow er Steady model discussed and used earlier.
In one sense these three generalisations can be viewed as a single generalisation that permits 
the states o f  unobserved processes to change in some random manner. Clearly G l and G3
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can be viewed as special cases o f  this generalisation, and G2 can be modelled as a special case 
o f  G3 by saying that we must observe one o f the (” )  processes obtained by grouping all the
We shall thus define the Generalised Multi Armed problem (G M A B P ), as a M ABP which 
permits random changes to the states o f unobserved processes.
As a first attempt to tackle the G M A B P  we shall investigate how far the the ideas underlying 
the Whittle proof can be extended. First, using the same notation as the previous section, we 
have the following
Lemma 7 .3 .1 .
I f  f2' (Sj (t +  /)  ) is a non decreasing function o f  I, then
The crux o f  the lemma is that <f>j depends on M  only through the immediate retirement 
option. Clearly this is only so when the optimal stopping time, r, is equal to 0 or oo, depending 
on whether M  >  M , or M  <  M , respectively.
possible combinations o f r processes out o f n.
(•>(*)> M ) =  m a x{M , M , (a, (t) }
furthermore
( « / ( < »  =  X > ‘ ! ? ( • » «  +  0 )
PROOF:
First note that an equivalent statem ent o f the form  o f  is
M  > M, 
M  <  M,
M , =  M , ( . , ( ! ) )
Let V , =  +  0  )  +  A 'M , thus =  m ax, U ,.
So the optimal stopping time is at r =  0 iff M  >  Ur for all r.
«» M ( l  -t')> J l ,«'(ii(l + I)) for all r
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And the optimal stopping time is at r =  oo iff t/«, >  UT for all r.
for all t
o  XTM  <  +  / ) ) for all r
O  Af <  inf•» M  ;aiK ;(» ,(I  +  r +  1) )  s M J - "
So <t>, is o f the specified form iff Afjower =  AfJ" pprr =  M } .
Let
iv ;  = £ A , f i ' , ( . , ( l  +  r +  0 )
so
M  “ pp"  =  sUp IV, and Af}ow*r =  inf
If we know that (sy(t +  / ) )  is a non-decreasing function o f  /, then a little algebra shows
Thus inf, W ;  =  WJ =  2 , “  o A‘  ^  K  (* +  0  ) =  M ' r "
Therefore M jow,r =  M “ pp"  =  £ ” o A '« ;  («y (i +  / ) )  =  M ,  □
And now;
T heorem 7.3.2.
If If} (a} (t +  / ) )  is a non decreasing function o f  l, then th e following are both  true for the 
GM ABP
(i) The optimal payoff is o f  the Whittle form  
(ii) The Gittins index policy is optimal
( . ,  ( i  +  ’ ) )  v  -  £  a ' r ;  ( . , ( i  +  0 ) ]  > °
Thus sup, W T =  W OB=  £ , “ 0 A '* ;  (sy (f +  /)  ) =  Af“ P P ".
Similarly
Wr\i =  ¿ A ' f l J ( s , ( t  +  r  + / +  1))  > j ^ A  , R'J(aJ(t + r + l ) )  =  W;
107

where
This equation is completely analogous to  (7.2.9) in Whittles proof. We know from Whittles 
proof that adoption o f a Gittins index policy makes p ,(M )6(M ) +  f *  6(m ) dp,(m ) equal to 
0. Therefore, F  is o f  the W hittle form  and a Gittins index policy is optimal, if and only if 
E [£ > ,(»(< + 1 ),M )] = 0 .
Now M j =  Yl'ilo A 'f?J(sy(t +  / ) )  >  i2J(sy(t)) A* — R|l1*_^ t> 1 >  k,by initial assumption. 
If we now choose M  such that M  <  k  we have the following:
(i) it will never be optimal to  retire, since M  < k < M , .
(ii) p j(s ,M ) =  0 for all states a.
Statement (i) is fine, as it simply means we are now just dealing with the GM ABP, and (ii) 
means that the condition E [D ,(s (t +  1), M)\ =  0 can now be written as
which, from the definition o f  A j(s (t  +  1), M ), is equivalent to
and from  the form o f  Pi(., M ) , is equivalent to
E [ * M « +  1), M ,. , ( « ( I +  1 ))] =  E [ * ( . , (< +  1 ),M ,0)1
The result follows immediately from  Lemma 7.3.1 . □
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We might now ask how likely it is that this condition will be satisfied for M A B P’s with the 
individual generalisations G l,  G2 and G3. Note that for a M ABP with generalisation G1 only, 
condition (*) simplifies to either one o f  the following being true 
(i) +  1 ) )  =  M j for all j  ?  i
i.e. for the deterministic updating o f  unobserved states.
(ii) M ,(« ,(t  +  1 ) )  >  M (i) and M , (*,(< +  1 ) )  > * /„ , (■ (< +  1 ) )
for all possible transitions o f the state o f the observed process.
An example is as follows.
Let the random variable X j( t )  represent the value process j  takes at time t, and assume 
X j ( t )  has p.d.f.
l  (> - r i M ‘
(7.3.4)* ,(< )  =  °
I, ( * )
where g ,(x )  is a known p.d.f. with bounded support. Now take the prior 
p{ ~  B e(a Jt , 0 ]t )
the Beta distribution with parameters o f , P\ . Dropping the superscript j ,  this prior is equiv­
alent to
= log ~  LBe(at,Pt)
the Logistic-Beta distribution with parameters a t ,0 t , which has p.d.f.
n(4 |„ .V r (o. + A )
p (4>,
Recall that the Logistic Beta and its multivariate analogue the Logistic Dirichlet were used 
extensively in chapter 4.
If we now let d>t develop with the Simple Power Steady model with discount factor k, we 
have
~  L B e(ka t ,k 0 t )  (7.3.5)
Where x ' are the observations from the particular process under consideration up to and 
including time t. An application o f Bayes theorem yields
L B c(ka t +  l ,k p t ) X (t  +  1) =  0 
[ L B e{ka , , kp, +  1) X (t  +  I) >  0 
Providing the updating o f  the prior parameters a t ,0 t . The forecast distributions are given by;
(7 3.6)
110
L e m m a  7 .3 .7 .
where
f x |.H ■ • (*!* ') =  {
P(« + .)
(1 -P { t+ ,ì )9 (* )
X (t  +  •) =  0 
X (t  +  s ) >  0
P(t f .)  =  Elp,+ .|x‘ ] =  -
P R O O F:
The result is immediate for a =  1, for a >  1 proceeding directly we have,
for all a
= />(*,». =0|x')
J J i= 1
= £  n  — =■»(«.*■)
r»Ol£C,
where 9, =  a * /a « +  /9f , Cr is the set o f all combinations o f  r integers out o f  1 , . . .  , «  -  2 , and 
x (u ,r ) =  att+r/ott+r +  Pt+r given that a particular combination v €  C , o f X t + i , . . -  ,Z t+ « - i  
are greater than 0.
Thus if  v =  * ! , . . .  ,»'r we have, from the updating (7.3.6),
V - ’ ch + k - ‘ -
t -M " .  +  A ) + e ;,- ’ *
the above double sum can now be computed, yielding p t+ , =  ott/c*t +  Pt- 
An identical argument to the above yields
/ x , + . (* | x ‘  n  X t+ .  >  0) =  (1 -  - ■ )g(x)
Of +  Pt
and the result is proved. □
This Lemma tells us that +  / ) )  is a non-decreasing function o f  /, (in fact it is a
constant function o f  / ) ,  and also that
where m , =  f  xg, (z )d z ,  is known.
Il l
The updating in (7.3.5) provides the deterministic updating of the states o f the unobserved 
processes, i.e. a t+1 =  kat , 0t+ i =  k0t . Thus
k ftm ,
(ka{ +  k 0i)(l -  A)
if process j  is an unobserved process at time t. Hence, from the theorem, if we are observing 
one process, at each time period, from  n processes developing independently with the above 
Simple Power Steady model, a Gittins index policy is optimal, and instructs us to observe the 
process with the largest value of
(<*; + # )
Note that this is simply a one step look ahead policy.
« =  1 , . . .  , n
It is worth mentioning that this example stemmed from an attempt to build a model for 
the tenderer based on ‘ spiked’ distributions o f the form (7.3.4). The logic behind this is that 
the tenderer will decide in his own mind a bid below which he will not award the contract, 
presumably because he would feel that quality would have to be compromised to produce such 
a low cost. On the assumption that the bidders are thinking along the same lines, we might 
model the bid distribution to be o f the form (7.3.4) with the spike o f  probability p  at this 
minimum bid and g(x) decreasing in x ,  for example an exponential distribution. However the 
example above illustrates that even with specific distributional assumptions, such as these, 
solution to the G M A B P is very difficult.
Although, as illustrated above, there are models for which theorem 7.3.2 is useful in deter­
mining a solution, the results in this section primarily serve to illustrate the difficulties faced 
in tackling complicated stochastic control problems such as the GMABP.
W ithout wishing to sound pessimistic, it is clear that if progress is to be made towards a 
practical model for the tenderer greater structure has to be incorporated in the formulation of 
the problem, leading to simpler stochastic control problems. This is one o f  the topics discussed 
in the next chapter. It should be stressed however that even simple well specified problems 
with finite tim e horizons can be computationally difficult and give results which are at first 
sight suprising, see for example Smith (1989 b).
112
8. F U R T H E R  R E S E A R C H
As just mentioned at the end o f chapter 7 one area very much in need o f  attention is the 
development o f a practical model for the tenderer. An obvious way to approach this is to 
introduce greater structure into the problem. A  simple model is as follows. Assume that 
bidders come from  one o f  three classes C , ,  C 2 and C3 , where, in terms o f  a random variable 
X  representing the value o f a bid made by a company in a given class, the classes are defined 
by
and that within C 2 the bidders are exchangeable, say. These classes can be interpreted as 
follows. Class C j contains known reliable bidders. In the above definition we are rescaling 
this reliable bid to be 0. Class C 2 contains known but more erratic bidders, while C3 contains 
companies about which we know very little. We also assume that when a company from C3 is 
invited to bid it can then be classified as being in Ci or C2 .
With this problem the tenderers decision space is given by
where decision (r1 ,r 2,r 3) corresponds to  inviting r, companies fron Cj to  bid. The state at 
time t is ( ¿ i ( t ) , « 2( t ) ,03(t) ) where Sj(t) is the number of companies in Cj at time t.
The advantage o f  this simple model is that we are at least able to conjecture the form o f the 
optimal decision with some confidence, that is
CONJECTURE. I f  *2 <  r, and s3 is large, the optimal decision is one o f  (0 ,s 2,r  -  s2), (0 ,0 ,r), 
( l , s 2, r -  s2 -  1), (1 ,0 ,r -  1), depending on F  and q.
That is, we either choose to reclassify companies from C3 immediately, or look to minimise 
immediate cost and reclassify companies from  C 3 with the remaining companies we are allowed 
to  invite to bid. Unfortunately attempts to  prove this conjecture have proved fruitless. Of 
course once s2 > r we no longer have a control problem and the optimal decision will clearly 
be one of (0 ,r ,0 ) or ( l , r  -  1 ,0) depending on F.
X  =  0 with probability 1
X  has known distribution function F
{  (ri>r2 ,r 3) | fj e N  and r, +  r2 +  r3 =  r }
113
Obviously this simple model needs to be made more general to be deemed practical. A  first 
step is to assume F  and q are unknown and allow ourselves to  update estimates o f  these at 
each time period, incorporating these estimates in the state vector.
A  further generalisation is to allow companies in C j and C 3 to  drift back into C 3 . So we 
would need to continually reclassify companies by inviting them to  bid. We would then also 
need to be updating estimates o f these drift probabilities.
The original aim o f  this thesis was to develop a game model for  the whole problem based 
on the ideas o f  Harsanyi (1967,1968a,b) and latterly Aumann (1987). The first stage in this 
process is to build simple decision theoretic models for the bidders and tenderer. This process 
has taken virtually the whole time available and as a result there has been no time to work on 
the game theoretic model, but briefly the approach is as follows.
Define the players in the game to be the tenderer and the n bidders. Then presumably this 
will be a game o f  incomplete information, i.e. a given player will be unaware o f his com peti­
tors attributes, for example the utilities they will be using. Nearly all existing game theory 
litereature discusses games with complete information, concentrating on developing solution 
concepts. Harsanyi is one o f  the few to have discussed games w ith  incomplete information. 
The main difficulty with the analysis o f these games is the infinite regress. For exam ple in 
a two player game where the competitors do  not know each others utilities it is natural for 
player 1 to make his move conditional on what he expects player 2 ’s utility to  be. But he must 
also make his move conditional on what he expects player 2 ’s expectation o f his utility will 
be, and so on ad infinitum. O f course in a many player game this regress becomes even more 
convoluted.
Harsanyi claims to have overcome this problem by defining a game with complete information 
(G *) that is game theoretically equivalent to the game with incomplete information (G ). A  
solution to the game G* can then be given without encountering the problems o f the infinite 
regress. Briefly the idea is as follows. Each player has associated with him an attribute vector, 
a , consisting o f  the unknowns about that player, for example his utility. It is then assumed 
that the components o f  a are randomly selected from  some known distribution prior to  the 
players deciding on their moves. Thus when the players decide their moves it will be a game 
o f  complete, but imperfect, information, this will be the game G *. A  game o f imperfect
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information is one in which players do not have the full history o f  previous moves or chance 
events. Solution concepts for these games have been studied extensively.
The main problem with the Harsanyi ideas, which are very well respected, is that there are 
virtually no practical examples o f a reduction from a game G  to a game G " . So the building o f a 
Harsanyi model for a complex game such as that arising in our problem would be a substantial 
and significant achievement.
O f course a number o f the more general areas are always ripe for further research. In 
particular the development o f a general multivariate dynamic generalised linear model would 
be very desirable. Some o f the problems that would be encountered in attempting to do this are 
illustrated in the development o f  the model in §4.4, for example the problems with constraints.
Another area is that o f the GM ABP. The aim here would be to prove that some form  o f 
index policy is optimal. Identifying the form o f  this index would not then be too difficult. An 
appropriate approach may be similar to that used by Nash (1980) and discussed in the review 
o f  §7.2.
Finally one must mention what is the least developed area o f  theory discussed in this thesis, 
namely that of finitely additive distributions. The An distributions and the o.i. distributions of 
chapter 6 are just about the only finitely additive distributions to be shown to have a practical 
application in decision theory. It seems very likely that there are many problems where other 
classes o f  finitely additive distributions could prove very useful.
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